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WorldScan, the CGE model for international policy analysis and long-term scenario studies, is 
applied regularly at the CPB. The production technology in the model is that of constant returns 
to scale and the market structure is characterized by perfect competition. However, it is a well 
known fact that many sectors such as manufacturing and service sectors feature increasing 
returns and firms compete imperfectly. To give the model more realism, it is therefore 
necessary to expand the model. Besides that, several research projects require an identification 
of scale economies in order to perform a sound welfare analysis. In this memorandum, I review 
the literature on scale economies and imperfect competition and analyze which approach is 
most suitable to implement in WorldScan. For the objectives at hand it appears most efficient to 
expand the model with an extended Dixit-Stiglitz approach. Simulations with an aggregated 
version of WorldScan show that the effects of incorporating scale economies are significant. 
Evidently, in a liberalisation scenario, sectors with increasing returns can exploit their 
technology more than sectors with constant returns, implying considerable increases in  
production and exports for these sectors. Concluding, this expansion of the model allows for an 
identification of formerly unidentified welfare effects.  
 
1 The author thanks Stefan Boeters, Arjan Lejour, Paul Veenendaal and George Gelauff for fruitful discussions and helpful 
comments and Gerard Verweij for his advise on programming issues. 
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1  Introduction 
WorldScan, the CGE model for international policy analysis and long-term scenario studies, is 
applied regularly at the CPB. The production technology in the model is that of constant returns 
to scale and the market structure is characterized by perfect competition. This market structure 
is also applied in sectors characterized by specific fixed factors leading to decreasing returns to 
scale. 
However, it is a well known fact that many manufacturing and service sectors feature 
increasing returns and firms within compete imperfectly. To give the model more realism, it is 
therefore necessary to expand the model. In particular, welfare effects of certain policy reforms 
could be underestimated, since scale economies are not identified.  
For several research projects there is a demand for relaxing the assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition. In the set-up fixed costs are financed from a mark-up 
on marginal costs. In the long run firms earn zero profit, because of free entry and exit of firms. 
Currently, the option for increasing returns to scale, also called economies of scale, and free 
entry and exit of firms is required in a project on the liberalisation of the European market for 
services as well as in an analysis of the European scheme for emissions trading. 
In a liberalized market for services, services with fewer barriers can be supplied to foreign 
customers. Usually, there is an initiative for setting up local offices, leading to set-up costs 
implying increasing returns to scale. The welfare effects of liberalising the EU-market for 
services are expected to be significant. Obviously, a model which identifies and describes 
increasing returns can better assess these welfare effects, than a model that just assumes 
constant returns to scale in a sector that in fact features increasing returns. 
EU member states compete in energy taxes in the sense that firms on average are taxed 
much lower than consumers. In addition, the largest users pay on average the least. A market 
structure of imperfect competition captures these aspects better than one of perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale. 
Besides these policy issues, we would like WorldScan to be up-to-date, since comparable 
models can also describe economies of scale. Furthermore, adjusting WorldScan in this way, 
leads to a better comparison of simulation results with other models, which is useful for the 
analysis. 
Concluding, the adjustments must enable WorldScan to identify and describe increasing 
returns. This memorandum discusses how the model might be adjusted. 
The following two subsections briefly discuss the basics behind economies of scale and 
imperfect competition.  4 
1.1  What are economies of scale? 
When more units of a good or a service can be produced on a larger scale, yet with (on average) 
less input costs, economies of scale are said to be achieved. Alternatively, this means that as a 
company grows and production increases, a company will have a better chance to decrease its 
average costs. According to theory, economic growth may be achieved when economies of 
scale are realized. 
Just as there are economies of scale, diseconomies of scale also exist. This occurs when 
growth of production is less than proportional to inputs. What this means is that there are 
inefficiencies within the firm or industry resulting in rising average costs. 
Alfred Marshall made a distinction between internal and external economies of scale. When 
a company reduces average costs and increases production, internal economies of scale have 
been achieved. External economies of scale occur outside the firm, within the industry. The 
section below lists several causes for internal and external (dis)economies of scale
2.  
 
As a firm produces more and more goods, internal economies of scale are made, so the average 
cost begins to fall because of 
 
·  technical economies made in the actual production of the good (e.g. large firms can use 
expensive machinery intensively),  
·  managerial economies made in the administration of a large firm by splitting up management 
jobs and employing specialist accountants, salesmen, etc.,  
·  financial economies made by borrowing money at lower rates of interest than smaller firms,  
·  marketing economies made by spreading the high cost of advertising on television and in 
national newspapers, across a large level of output,  
·  commercial economies made when buying supplies in bulk and therefore gaining a larger 
discount and  
·  research and development economies made when developing new and better products. 
 
External economies of scale occur outside the firm as a result of its location and occur when 
 
·  a local skilled labor force is available,  
·  specialist local back-up firms can supply parts or services,  
·  an area has a good transport network,  
 
2 For a detailed discussion see also www.bized.ac.uk. 
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·  an area has an excellent reputation for producing a particular good or  
·  sharing of technology or managerial expertise (‘spillover’). 
 
As mentioned before, diseconomies may also occur. In internal diseconomies average costs for 
a firm eventually rise as production increases, because 
 
·  the disadvantages of the division of labor take effect,  
·  management becomes out of touch with the shop floor and some machinery becomes over-
manned,  
·  decisions are not taken quickly and there is too much form filling,  
·  lack of communication in a large firm means that management tasks sometimes get done twice, 
or  
·  poor labor relations may develop in large companies. 
 
When too many firms locate in one area, unit costs in the industry begin to rise, because 
 
·  local labor becomes scarce and firms now have to offer higher wages to attract new workers,  
·  land and factories become scarce and rents begin to rise or  
·  local roads become congested and so transport costs begin to rise. 
 
When (dis)economies of scale are location specific, trade is used in order to gain access to 
efficiencies. The main reason why the presence of economies of scale can generate trade gains 
is because of the reallocation of resources. 
In practice, the most common cause for (and way to model) increasing returns is (to allow 
for) a decreasing average cost curve as already said in the introduction of this chapter. The 
classical specification of a decreasing cost curve is given by the following reciprocal function: 
 
AC = f / x + c,                (1) 
 
where AC denote average costs, f are the fixed costs, x is total production and c are the marginal 
costs of production. This type of reduced form structure can represent both internal economies 
of scale, see Francois (1990) and external economies of scale, see Markusen (1990). It will be 
the starting point of this paper. 
   6 
1.2  What is imperfect competition? 
There is imperfect competition as soon as an agent in the model no longer takes market prices 
as given. 
Basically, there are three forms of imperfect competition. The simplest imperfectly 
competitive market structure is that of a pure monopoly, a market in which a firm faces no 
competition. The Dutch Railways is an example of a pure monopoly. 
The second form of imperfect competition is oligopoly. The term oligopoly has Greek roots 
meaning few sellers. That is the way in which oligopoly differs both from perfect competition 
and monopoly: there is more than one seller, but not many more. For the small number of 
sellers to be stable, there presumably must be some barriers to entry for new competitors. 
The final form of imperfect competition is monopolistic competition. In monopolistic 
competition the products sold by the firms in the industry are not homogeneous but 
differentiated. Thus, each firm has a “monopoly” of its own product. However, this is not a true 
monopoly, such as Microsoft, because the differentiated products are close substitutes. 
Monopolistic competition retains many features of perfect competition, such as the presence of 
many firms in the industry and the likelihood that free entry and exit of firms in response to 
profit would eliminate economic profit among the firms. As a result, this last form of imperfect 
competition offers a somewhat more realistic description of many common economic markets. 
Examples include automobiles, toothpaste, beer, cheese and many more. 
Because competition is imperfect, there is not only competition in prices, but also in 
advertising and the characteristics of the good.  
Perfect competition assumes homogeneity of products. This assumption is relaxed with 
imperfect competition and products are called heterogeneous or differentiated. Products are 
differentiated when they are not perfect substitutes, but close substitutes. Product differentiation 
increases variety, but it divides up the market, leading to higher prices and costs. In some 
industries, like the computer industry, there is a lot of competition to introduce a product that is 
superior to rival products. This is good for customers, because the quality of products improves. 
Unfortunately, this kind of competition could lead to overinvestment and waste of resources. 
The advantage of non-price competition is that, while rivals will likely react to non-price 
competition, their reaction is often slower and less direct than would be the case for a price cut. 
Economists have taken two main routes to address imperfect market structures according to 
Neary (2002). At the micro level, economists in the field of industrial organization have 
developed quite a few sophisticated models, which focus on strategic interaction between firms 
in a single market. At the more aggregate level, many research areas such as international trade, 
macroeconomics and economic growth, have used monopolistic competitive models to 
incorporate scale economies and product differentiation into a general equilibrium context. We 
shall elaborate a bit more on oligopoly and monopolistic competition, starting with oligopoly.   7 
1.2.1  Oligopoly 
There exist four major hypotheses about oligopoly pricing: 
 
1.  The oligopoly firms conspire and collaborate to charge the monopoly price and get monopoly 
profits (cooperative). Examples are models for cartels or tacit collusion. 
2.  The oligopoly firms will compete on price so that the price and profits will be the same as those 
of a perfect competitive industry (non-cooperative). A famous example is the Bertrand model. 
3.  The oligopoly price and profits will be somewhere within the range of the previous hypotheses. 
Most of the literature favours this hypothesis. Examples are the Cournot model and the Von 
Stackelberg model. 
4.  Oligopoly prices and profits are “indeterminate”. That is, they may be anywhere within the 
range and are unpredictable. 
 
In an oligopoly, pricing is best thought of as a strategic decision. Modern study of strategy is 
called game theory, because of the analogy to strategies in a game. Game theory assumes that 
people are rational and self-interested, the “rules of the game” are stable, everybody knows 
them and each player’s payoff depends on the strategies chosen by others, as well as oneself. 
One possible distinction in forms of oligopoly is between cooperative and non-cooperative. 
The first describes the theory and practice of cartels and tacit collusion. Cartels are most likely 
to form when there is a relatively small number of firms (making coordination and monitoring 
easier), difficult entry conditions (allowing price increases to be more durable), a trade 
association that can coordinate output market shares, monitor prices, even allocate orders and 
some credible form of punishment for cheaters. Thus to be able to raise prices without inducing 
substantial increased competition from non-members. Moreover, expected punishment for 
forming a cartel must be low relative to the advantages. Finally, the cost of establishing and 
enforcing an agreement must be low relative to the expected gains. 
When firms in an oligopoly coordinate their actions despite the lack of an explicit cartel 
agreement, we say that the resulting coordination is tacit collusion. Empirical evidence by for 
example Hay and Kelley (1974) indicates that collusion of all kinds is more likely in highly 
concentrated industries. 
Non-cooperative oligopoly models assume few sellers, who may have similar or different 
costs, high entry/exit costs, products may be identical or differentiated and price or quantity 
may be the strategic variable. As said before there are three well known models of non-
cooperative oligopoly, i.e. the Cournot model, Bertrand model and Von Stackelberg model. 
Since these models form the roots of the industrial organization theory, a brief discussion seems 
appropriate. 
While the Cournot model features firms engaging in quantity rivalry, which seems less 
reasonable than direct price competition, it yields outcomes in which there is an inverse   8 
relationship between market concentration and the extent to which market outcomes yield 
marginal cost pricing. Cournot oligopoly models can feature identical or differentiated products, 
identical or heterogeneous costs, and a wide variety of number of firms. The most simple 
formulation is a duopoly with identical costs (cQ) and products. When a simple linear inverse 
demand function P(Q) = a -  bQ, where Q = q1 + q2 is assumed and firms maximize profits, the 
best response for both firms, taking the other firm’s reaction curve into consideration, is q1 = q2 
= (a- c)/3b. The market output in the Cournot equilibrium falls right in between the monopoly 
equilibrium output level, 2(a- c)/3b, and the perfect competitive equilibrium output level, (a- 
c)/b. When the number of firms increases, the total market output moves closer to the perfect 
competitive output. The other way around, when the number of firms decreases, the market 
output moves closer to the monopoly output. This can also be seen from the Lerner index, 
which is equivalent to the extent to which price exceeds marginal cost. In the case of the 
Cournot model, the Lerner index is equal to (P- C’(Q))/P = (nED)
-1, where n is the number of 
firms and ED is the demand elasticity. Hence, when n increases the Lerner index gets smaller 
implying that the market structure is getting more competitive. When the assumption of 
identical costs is dropped, it can be proved that firms with low costs have larger market share 
than firms with high costs. 
The Bertrand model was developed because Bertrand criticized the Cournot idea of quantity 
rivalry and instead argued that firms actually engage in price rivalry. If firms are identical, and 
if there are no binding capacity constraints, then the Bertrand non-cooperative oligopoly model 
has the unsatisfactory result that even with only two firms, the equilibrium is P = c. Price 
rivalry drives prices downward as firms compete for market share. Undercutting your rival’s 
cost results in you getting the entire market for yourself. This dynamic results in the competitive 
outcome regardless of market structure. However, if products are differentiated, firms collude, 
or buyers are poorly informed of price, then the Bertrand equilibrium will not occur. 
Another common non-cooperative oligopoly model was developed by Von Stackelberg. 
This model involves a dominant firm (the leader) and a competitive fringe (the followers). 
Basically, the dominant firm knows how the fringe will react to its actions and can so take 
action that tailors the anticipated fringe response to best suit the dominant firm’s profitability. 
In a situation with two firms, one leader, one follower, identical costs and products, the 
equilibrium outcome is: qL = (a- c)/2b and qF = (a- c)/4b. Hence, the market output level in 
equilibrium falls between the Cournot equilibrium output level and the perfect competitive 
equilibrium one. All oligopoly equilibrium outcomes are summarized in Table 1.1.   9 
Table 1.1    Oligopoly equilibrium outcomes 
  Bertrand  Cournot  Stackelberg  Monopoly 
   
p  c  (a+2c)/3  (a+3c)/4  (a+c)/2 
q1  (a- c)/2b  (a- c)/3b  (a- c)/2b  (a- c)/2b 
q2  (a- c)/2b  (a- c)/3b  (a- c)/4b  n/a 
pi  0  (a- c)
2/9b  (a- c)
2/8b, (a- c)
2/16b  (a- c)
2/4b 
          Note: outcomes are based on the following demand and cost functions: P(Q) = a -  bQ, where Q = q1 + q2 and C(qi) = cqi, i 
= 1,2; pi denotes profit of firm i. 
 
1.2.2  Monopolistic Competition 
In oligopoly, the main assumption is that the market consists of just a few firms, which can 
compete strategically with each other. When the number of firms increases and becomes large, 
firms are not able anymore to compete strategically with each other and take each others actions 
as given. Such a market structure is called monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition 
is a cross between the two extremes of perfect competition and monopoly. There is free entry 
and exit of firms and production technologies are those of increasing returns to scale. What I 
know from the literature, monopolistic competition and scale economies are often mentioned 
together. 
Products are differentiated horizontally or vertically. With horizontal product differentiation, 
each consumer prefers products that have certain characteristics. These may be geographical or 
product-oriented. Vertical product differentiation entails people can generally agree on a 
preference ranking. 
Products are imperfectly substitutable. Consumer demand for differentiated products is 
sometimes described using two distinct approaches: the love-of-variety approach (homogeneous 
demand) and the ideal variety approach (heterogeneous demand). The first approach assumes 
each consumer has a demand for multiple varieties of a product over time, e.g. restaurant meals. 
If all consumers share the same love-of-variety, then the aggregate market will sustain demand 
for many varieties of goods simultaneously.  
The second approach assumes each product consists of a collection of different 
characteristics and each consumer has different preferences over these characteristics. The 
consumer chooses a product closest to their ideal variety subject to the price of the good.  
Monopolistic competition is usually conceptualized using the representative consumer 
model. The utility of the representative consumer embodies the preferences of the aggregate 
population of consumers and is defined over all products. In this case, preferences are 
symmetric. In this memorandum we only consider homogeneous demand and representative 
consumer models.   10 
One particular theory finds itself at the roots of the economic literature on monopolistic 
competition. That is the theory by Chamberlin (1933). Edward Hastings Chamberlin is 
considered the “true revolutionary” (Blaug, 1997, p. 376) for proving under certain assumptions 
that a equilibrium exists in a market characterized by monopolistic competition and increasing 
returns to scale. Essentially, these assumptions include (Bishop, 1967, p. 252): 
 
·  number of sellers in group of firms is sufficiently large, such that each firm takes the behaviour 
of other firms in the group as given; 
·  group of firms is well defined and relatively small compared to the whole economy; 
·  products are economically differentiated and consumers love variety and; 
·  free entry and exit of firms. 
 
In short, the monopolistic elements are those in the second and third assumption, which 
basically say that products are unique and give firms market power. Free entry and exit and the 
large number of firms ensure competition. 
Figure 1  Chamberlinian monopolistic competition 
 
To keep the discussion as simple as possible, I assume identical demand and cost conditions. A 
firm faces two individual demand curves. The first demand curve (dd) represents demand 
assuming all other firms in the group do not react to price changes of the firm under 
consideration. The second demand curve (DD) represents demand assuming other firms do 
react and set prices identically. DD is steeper than dd representing a lower price elasticity. Now, 
firms maximize profit, taking as given dd, by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. It 
can be shown that dd is tangent to the average cost curve implying zero profit. Since all firms 
are identical with respect to demand and cost conditions, all firms make zero profit. Hence,   11 
there is no incentive for new firms to enter and for incumbent firms to exit the market. This is 
known as the Chamberlinian equilibrium, which is illustrated in figure 1.  
The purpose of this paper is to compare several modelling alternatives for imperfect 
competition and scale economies and make a recommendation in the light of the problem issues 
discussed in the introduction. In section 2 I review more of the recent literature on monopolistic 
and oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the relevant properties 
of a selection of recently applied general equilibrium models and confronts these models with 
each other. Section 4 gives a recommendation for modelling imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale in WorldScan and analyzes the effects of this approach through 
simulations. Finally, I end with some concluding remarks. 
 
2  Background 
In the previous section I introduced oligopoly and monopolistic competition with a short 
description of the models from Cournot and Chamberlin. As already said earlier, economic 
literature shows among others two main research areas in microeconomic theory. First, there is 
industrial organization, which includes small group models focusing on strategic interaction 
between agents. The second mainstream in microeconomic theory is monopolistic competition. 
Monopolistic competition particularly works with large group models, hence, where the 
number of firms is large and strategic interaction is absent. 
I will briefly discuss the background of modelling monopolistic competition and oligopoly 
in general equilibrium. I do not intend to give a full survey of the literature. For those interested, 
I refer to Brakman and Heijdra (2002) for a full survey of the literature on monopolistic 
competition. Recently, a review of the book was published in the “Journal of International 
Economics” by Redding (2005). Redding is full of praise about the book. His article starts with, 
quote, ‘This is an important book that should be read by all research economists ...’ and 
furthermore concludes with, quote, ‘This book is a tremendous tribute to the ‘second 
monopolistic competition revolution’ initiated by the path-breaking work of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977)’. In contrast to the rich literature on monopolistic competition in general equilibrium, the 
literature on oligopoly in general equilibrium is very thin, as Neary (2002) makes clear. 
According to J. Peter Neary the development of tractable models of oligopoly in general 
equilibrium has been held back by a number of related problems. Nevertheless, Neary (2002) 
accommodates these problems and sketches a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model 
that ensures theoretical consistency and tractability. 
For the remainder of this section, I first present a simple version of the Dixit-Stiglitz (DS) 
(large group) model and discuss its key properties, as it is the ‘workhorse model’ for most 
currently applied models discussed in the next section. Next, I present the GOLE (small group)   12 
model of Neary (2002) and provide some discussion on the similarities and differences between 
DS and GOLE. 
2.1  Monopolistic Competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz 
Where Chamberlin (1933) failed in constructing a canonical model for monopolistic 
competition, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) succeeded. They formulated a model which is both easily 
tractable and captures the key aspects of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. The main 
contributions of this seminal article by Dixit and Stiglitz are threefold. First, the definition of a 
sector or group of firms is simplified. In particular, all varieties are symmetric and aggregated 
into a composite good using a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function. In their paper 
DS also consider a variable elasticity case. However, the constant elasticity case has become 
known as the DS model. Second, the utility function is separable and homothetic with convex 
indifference curves and all commodities have unit income elasticities. Separability allows the 
use of a two-stage budgeting approach, where income is allocated to composite goods in the 
first stage and reallocated to product varieties in the second stage. Usually, in the first stage a 
Cobb-Douglas specification is applied and in the second stage a CES-utility function.
3 Third, 
technology features internal economies of scale and firms are identical. 
The DS model provides an important tool, and is a simple formulation for the analysis of a 
variety of problems, from international trade to economic geography and from macroeconomics 
to economic growth. The book of Brakman and Heijdra (2002) contains a survey of every of 
these fields of research. In the international trade literature, the DS model lead to a very 
productive line of research, often referred to as the new trade theory initiated by Krugman 
(1979, 1980). Moreover, Ethier (1982) explained the large volume of two-way trade in producer 
goods by using the DS framework. The DS model was also applied for modelling multinational 
firms and firm heterogeneity. 
Perhaps, the DS model has influenced the development of economic geography even 
greater. Krugman (1991) combined the DS model with ice-berg transportation costs (see 
Samuelson, 1954) and developed the so-called core-periphery model, also known as the 
Krugman model, which explains the determinants of the location of economic activity. 
Research by Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996) also introduced vertical 
linkages between firms. The DS framework was also used to shed light on the development and 
relationship between cities. For a full survey of the literature see e.g. Brakman, Garretsen and 
Van Marrewijk (2001), Fujita and Thisse (2002) and Baldwin et al. (2003). 
Where the first model of monopolistic competition by Chamberlin failed to impact 
macroeconomic literature (amongst other causes) by the Keynesian revolution, it was just this 
 
3 For a detailed discussion of separability of preferences and the two stage budgeting approach, see Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980), Chapter 5.   13 
strand of literature that accepted and used the DS framework to provide microfoundations for 
the ideas of Keynesian macroeconomics. Many other macroeconomic models were developed 
with monopolistically competitive price or wage setting. A survey can be found in Chapter 17 
of Brakman and Heijdra (2002). 
Economic growth is closely related to international trade. Romer (1990) showed how a DS 
model of intermediate inputs combined with endogenous investments in research and 
development (R&D) to develop new varieties of inputs, could lead to long run growth by 
increasing specialization. Basically, the DS model was the essential building block for the new 
generation of growth models of Romer (1990) and others. The literature analyzes a large 
number of issues, including the determinants of R&D-based economic growth, the role of 
public policies and scale effects. In addition, there exists some literature, that views growth as a 
process of creative destruction related to the links between market structure, innovation and the 
internal organization of the firm, see Redding (2005, p. 535). For a survey of the literature, see 
Chapter 14 of Brakman and Heijdra (2002). 
All in all, we can conclude, that the monopolistic competitive framework by Dixit and 
Stiglitz has had a profound impact - much more than the model of Chamberlin - on the literature 
in the fields of international trade, economic geography, macroeconomics and economic 
growth. Next follows a simple version of the DS model. 
2.1.1  The basic model 
Demand side 
There are two industries in the economy. One, sector 0, produces a homogeneous good under 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The other, sector 1, consists of a large number 
of monopolistically competitive firms, which produce under scale economies at firm level. The 
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where u is utility, x0 is consumption of the homogeneous good in sector 0, y is the consumption 
of the composite of varieties in sector 1 and β is the Cobb-Douglas share parameter. The 
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where n is the number of varieties, xi is the consumption of variety i, and ε is the elasticity of 
substitution. The interpretation of ε is, that as it increases, products become more   14 
‘substitutable’. Another interpretation can be given if we define γ as the marginal love-of-
variety which can be shown to be equal to 1/(ε- 1). Hence, when varieties become less 
substitutable, consumers prefer more varieties, γ increases, which seems logical
4. 
The consumer faces the following budget constraint, 
 
I x p x p
n
i
i i = +∑
=1
0 0 ,                (4) 
 
where p0 is the price for the homogeneous good in sector 0 and pi is the price of variety i in 
sector 1, and I is the consumer’s income. The consumer maximizes (2), given (3) and (4) and 
prices p0 and pi. Following the two stage budgeting approach, we obtain: 
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The result is that household income is spent linear with the share parameter as usual with the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Here, py is the composite price of a bundle of all varieties chosen 
in a utility maximizing fashion. The last equation represents the individual firm’s perceived 
demand curve (“dd-curve”). The industry demand curve (“DD-curve”) is derived when we 
assume symmetry for firms. Hence, prices and consumption levels are equal for all i (p = pi "i). 
The industry demand curve becomes (6). The dd-curve is more elastic than the DD-curve, since 
Edd = ε > 1 = EDD. 
 
. ) 1 (
np
I
x b - =                 (6) 
Supply side 
Assume the only production factor is labour, which is perfectly mobile. Sector 0 features 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Hence technology and price are given by: 
 
 
4 Bénassy (1996) stresses that love-of-variety and ease of substitution are two different phenomena. However, in the basic 
DS model, these cannot be distinguished. Therefore, in the basic DS model we refer to γ as the love-of-variety.   15 
,   and  
0
0 0 0 0 a
w
p L a x = =               (7) 
 
where L0 is the amount of labour used in sector 0, a0 is the labour productivity and w is the 
wage rate in the economy. From (7) we see that marginal and average cost pricing both lead to 
zero profit. 
Sector 1 features increasing returns to scale at firm level and monopolistic competition. The 
economies of scale are modelled in a natural way by imposing a fixed set-up cost for the 
production process. The interpretation is that firms must employ a minimum amount of labour, 
so-called overhead labour, before they can produce output at all. Firms maximize profit subject 
to the downward sloping individual perceived demand curve (dd). We assume no barriers exist 
for firms to enter and exit the market. As a result, all firms earn zero profit and thus choose 
prices equal to average cost. Because firms have to finance their fixed cost, prices are equal to 
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where f is the fixed cost and w/ai(ε- 1) is the markup over marginal cost. In the optimization, 
price and income effects are ignored. The income effect is also known as the Ford effect, see 
Ford (1922). Here, ignoring these effects is allowed, because we assume a sufficiently large 
number of firms in the monopolistically competitive sector. When we allow for small groups of 
firms, price and income effects cannot be ignored. Yang and Heijdra (1993) adjust for price 
effects, but neglect income effects. d’Aspremont et al. (1996) describe a model without 
neglecting any indirect effects. Section 2.1.2 goes deeper into the analysis of these indirect 
effects. 
Market equilibrium 
The model is fully symmetric. All active firms produce the same output, pay the same wage, 
use the same amount of labour and earn the same profit. Therefore, we can drop the subscript i. 
Before we solve the model, we have to make assumptions about the labour market. In 
particular, since profits are zero in equilibrium, household income is equal to income earned 
from (fixed) labour, say wL
S. Furthermore, we assume that the labour market clears in 
equilibrium. 
By substituting the markup pricing rule into the profit function and using the assumption of 
free entry and exit of firms, implying zero profit, the output level per active firm is equal to   16 
( ). 1 - = e af x                 (9) 
 
Obviously, the optimal output level depends only on the fixed cost (expressed in units of 
output), labour productivity and the demand elasticity. Combining (7) and the fact that 
household income is equal to labour income yields the output in sector 0: 
 
. 0 0
S L a x b =                  (10) 
 
From (10) and the market clearing condition on the labour market it is clear, that output for both 
sectors is a constant fraction of the amount of labour supply. 
Combining (8), (9), (10) and the market clearing condition on the labour market yields a 
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The equilibrium number of firms depends positively on the labour supply in the 
monopolistically competitive sector and negatively on the fixed cost and the demand elasticity 
as expected. 
The output of the composite good in sector 1 is equal to
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where l = a(ε- 1)/ε (fε)
- 1/(ε- 1) and L1 = (1- b)L
S. Equation (12) shows increasing returns to 
labour, because ε/(ε- 1) is larger than one. 
Welfare 
The previous section considered the market equilibrium. Now, one would like to know whether 
the model outcome is Pareto efficient and can be decentralized. In particular, does the 
Chamberlinian equilibrium provide too much or too little variety? 
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In the welfare optimum the central planner allocates goods in both sectors and chooses the 
number of active firms in the monopolistically competitive sector, such that the household’s 
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Let the superscript ‘^’ denote the social optimal values of the variables. Solving the model 
yields the following internal solution
6: 
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Comparing (14) to (10)-(12) shows that individual firm output in the monopolistically 
competitive sector is equal in both cases. It appears that aggregate output levels for both sectors 
are different in the market equilibrium and the social optimum. In sector 0, too much output is 
produced and this is not socially optimal. In sector 1, the opposite is the case. Hence, the 
Chamberlinian equilibrium provides too few varieties as compared to the welfare optimum. 
The solution of the general equilibrium model makes clear, that for decentralization, hence 
marginal cost pricing, we need to impose an ad-valorem tax. Assume that each active firm 
receives an ad-valorem product subsidy (to cover the fixed set-up cost). The markup rule in (8) 
now becomes: 
 









t .                (15) 
Since the social optimum requires marginal cost pricing (p = w/a), instead of average cost 
pricing, it follows from (15), that the socially optimal product subsidy, t, is equal to the mark-
up, ε/(ε- 1). Note that this social optimum is a first-best decentralizable solution of our simple 
version of the DS model. 
 
 
6 A boundary solution can be found when imposing a lower bound on the number of firms. In that case the business stealing 
effect - output per firm decreases when the number of firms increases - is stronger than the preference-for-diversity effect, 
see Mankiw and Whinston (1986, p. 49).   18 
In short, the key properties of the DS model can be summarized as follows. Firms have market 
power, because goods are imperfect substitutes. Firms exploit this market power by setting 
price above marginal cost and cover their fixed cost. This is not socially optimal, because that 
would require marginal cost pricing. To solve this problem, an ad-valorem tax is introduced, 
which is used for funding the set-up cost. Concluding, the DS model offers a tractable 
framework to model imperfect competition and economies of scale and captures the key 
insights of Chamberlin. Through the last three decades, the DS model can be seen as the 
foundation of more extended models in several fields of research. 
2.1.2  Extensions 
Market power and love-of-variety: two distinct phenomena 
It has been argued by Bénassy (1996) and Broer and Heijdra (2001) that love-of-variety by 
households is conceptually different from market power by individual firms. This was first 
acknowledged by Dixit and Stiglitz in their working paper on the DS model in February 1975. 
The discussion there entails utility could also directly be a function of the range of varieties 
actually produced as a public good, besides the consumed amounts. Following Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1975), a convenient but not necessarily more restrictive function for the composite good in 
sector 1 is the one in (16), 
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where ε/(ε-1) captures the market power of firms in the monopolistic competitive sector and q 
captures the love-of-variety. If q is equal to unity, then consumers are indifferent to variety. At 
the same time, firms do possess market power, as ε/(ε- 1) > 1 (since ε > 1 by assumption). 
Obviously, in the basic model in section 2.1.1, q equals ε/(ε- 1) and the two effects cannot be 
distinguished. 
The two-stage budgeting approach still holds and the analysis is almost unchanged. The 
interior equilibrium (denoted by a superscript ‘e’) for the monopolistic competitive sector is 
then: 
 
























=     (17) 
where l’ = af
1- q(q-1)
(q- 1)q
-- q and L1 = (1- b)L
S. From (17) we notice that p
e, x
e and n
e are the 
same as in (8), (9) and (11). However, y
e has changed. Comparing, the composite output in (17) 
to (12), we find that q regulates whether there are increasing (q > 1) or constant (q = 1) returns 
to labour at an aggregated level. Note that, at firm level, we still have increasing returns to   19 
scale. In addition, when q equals one there are constant returns to scale, but still we have 
monopolistic competition
7. 
The first-best social optimum also changes in the extended model compared to the basic 
model. The solution is in fact the same as in (14), except that the control parameter is not the 
demand elasticity, ε, but the love-of-variety parameter q
8. Therefore, the same discussion as for 
the comparison of market equilibrium to the social optimum holds here. Indeed, the comparison 
of the social optima in the basic and extended model depends crucially on the values for q, the 
love-of-variety-parameter and ε/(ε- 1), the mark-up. 
The first-best social (unconstrained) optimum can still be decentralized by imposing a 
product subsidy equal to ε/(ε- 1), as in the basic model. However, here we additionally need a 
lump-sum tax to adjust firm size and the number of firms to their socially optimal values. If this 
lump-sum tax instrument is not available in a given context, then one could revert to a second-
best social (constrained) optimum by finding an optimal trade-off between removing the 
monopoly distortion and producing an optimal amount of varieties. The optimal product 
subsidy is then equal to q - 1.  
In the standard DS model, q = ε/(ε- 1) holds and a product subsidy equal to ε/(ε- 1) is 
imposed, the social welfare optimum is decentralizable. In general, however, preference-for-
diversity and degree of market power are different concepts and hence take on different values: 
q ≠ ε/(ε- 1). Thus, the social welfare optimum is not decentralizable, unless a lump-sum tax is 
introduced as an additional instrument to adjust the output in the monopolistic sector to its 
socially optimal value. Hence, for decentralization we need two instruments. This is also known 
as the Tinbergen rule, see Tinbergen (1952). 
Include indirect effects 
In large group models (the number of firms, n, is sufficiently large), such as the basic DS model 
in section 2.1.1 it is convenient and allowed to neglect terms of the order 1/n in the computed 
elasticities. However, when n is not sufficiently large, indirect effects such as price index 
effects and income effects cannot be ignored. In the literature two adjustments have been 
explored. First, there is the approach of Yang and Heijdra (1993), who take into account the 
price index effect, but keeping income fixed. Hence, this approach is still an approximation 
since it adjusts partially for indirect effects. Second, there is the approach of d’Aspremont et al. 
(1996), who also take into account the income effects, and is therefore preferable to the 
approximation approach of Yang and Heijdra. I shall briefly elaborate on both methods. 
 
7 The marginal preference for variety is equal to the elasticity of the average preference-for-diversity, which can be 
computed by comparing the value of composite consumption, y, obtained if n varieties and x/n units per variety are chosen 
with the value of y if x units of a single variety are chosen (n = 1), see Bénassy (1996). The marginal love-of-variety is 1/(ε-1) 
in the basic DS model, where it is q-1, in the extended model. Hence, when q = ε/(ε-1), the extended model collapses to the 
basic model. 
8 Note that, this does not mean that ε can directly be replaced by θ in (14). However, ε should be replaced by θ/(θ-1).   20 
In the DS model, the first-order condition for profit maximization is given by equating marginal 
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In the standard DS model in section 2.1.1, the elasticity of demand, ei, is calculated considering 
only the direct effect on demand of a change in price, neglecting the indirect effects through I 
and py. Thus using the third equation in (5), the elasticity of demand equals the intrasector 
elasticity of substitution:  
 
e e = DS
i .                  (19) 
Where DS only use the third equation in (5), Yang and Heijdra also use the first two equations 
and take into account the effect of pi on py. After some algebra, the elasticity of demand is 
obtained as in (20). 
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For a general overall utility function, the elasticity of demand according to Yang and Heijdra is 
a weighted average of the intra- and intersectoral elasticity of substitution. However, here we 
have chosen for a Cobb-Douglas specification, implying the intersectoral elasticity of 
substitution equals one. Therefore, (20) is somewhat simplified. In case of symmetry, ‘»’ can be 
replaced by ‘=’. Obviously, when n* is large, i.e. approaches infinity, the elasticity of demand is 
again equal to the intrasectoral elasticity of substitution. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that income I is kept fixed independently of pi. Yang and Heijdra take into account indirect 
effects within a sector. However, they ignore economy wide indirect effects.  
A more complete approach, which also takes into account Ford effects, is the one developed 
by d’Aspremont et al. The recognition that income depends on firm’s prices naturally follows 
from splitting income into labour endowment in terms of wage and distributed profits. Since 
profits depend on prices, also income depends on prices. Combining, (5) and the fact that 
income depends on firm’s prices, yields the following implicit elasticity of demand for a 
symmetrical equilibrium: 
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The first term coincides with ei
DS. Including the second term leads to ei
YH. When income effects 
are also taken into account, the elasticity of demand becomes (21). (21) is an implicit solution, 
which can be rewritten as a quadratic equation for which a unique solution exists
9. Since e > 1 
in the DS model, we have the following relation for n* > 1: e* < e*
YH < e*
DS. It appears that 
taking into account the indirect effects of a price change leads to a gradual decrease in the 
elasticity of demand and hence an increase in monopoly power. From (11) we know that the 
optimal number of varieties is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. Hence, when n is 
small and the DS approximation is used, the equilibrium number of activities is underestimated. 
Concluding, in a large group model it is convenient to use the DS approximation. However, 
in a small group model one should adjust for indirect effects by using the YH approximation or 
preferably the objective approach by d’Aspremont et al. 
Variable elasticity of substitution 
So far we have assumed a constant intrasectoral elasticity of substitution for the monopolistic 
competitive sector. In this section the implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed. 
We still keep the Cobb-Douglas overall utility function, but the CES function for the 
monopolistic competitive sector is replaced with a non-homothetic, but still separable utility 
function: 
 















i x v x u ,              (22) 
where v is increasing and concave. This example originates from Dixit and Stiglitz (1975, 
section 4.5). Because the derivations and algebra are rather involved and opaque, we omit them 
and focus on the results. For the interested reader I refer to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) and 
Spence (1974). 
The market equilibrium based on (22) is almost identical as for the basic model, except that 
in (6)-(12) b and e are now functions of the equilibrium firm output level, xe, instead of 
constants. In a welfare optimum price and output need not be the same as in the market 
equilibrium. It all depends on the sign of r’(x), where r(x) = xv’(x)/v(x). Dixit and Stiglitz give 
the following intuition behind this result: 
“With our large group assumptions, the revenue of each firm is proportional to xv’(x). However, the 
contribution of output to group utility is v(x). The ratio of the two is r(x). Therefore, if r’(x) > 0, then at 
the margin each firm finds it more profitable to expand than what would be socially desirable.” 
 
9 The quadratic equation is:  ( ) ( ) { } ( )( ) 0 1 1 * * 1 * 1 * * * 2 = - - + + - + - - e b e b e b e n n n n . This can be rewritten as  0 * *2 = + + c b a e e , 
which is a parabola. From mathematics we know that this equation has a solution for e*.   22 
In short, the market equilibrium produces larger amounts but a smaller number of varieties, than 
in the social welfare optimum. Further, we can conclude that the implications are not as 
unambiguous as in the basic DS model. 
Asymmetry 
In the basic DS model we have assumed symmetry within the monopolistic competitive sector. 
An important modification may be to remove this assumption. This modification is also treated 
in the DS working paper from 1975. More generally, they ask the question: “... will the right set 
of commodities be produced in the monopolistically competitive equilibrium? And if not, can we 
say anything about the nature of the biases?”. They argue that the produced set of commodities 
and thus also the possible bias depends on a number of factors: fixed and marginal cost, own 
and cross-elasticities of demand and the level of the demand schedule. As in the previous 
paragraph on variable elasticities, here, I again omit any formulae and just present the 
implications of relaxing the assumption of symmetry. 
The basic principle for the existence of biases between the monopolistic competitive optimal 
output and social optimal output is the trade-off between the ability to earn enough revenue to 
cover fixed costs and the desirability to take into account the consumer surplus.  
DS show that while low own elasticity commodities have the potential of earning relatively 
large revenues over marginal costs, they may not be able to do so if there is a high cross-
elasticity with a high own elasticity commodity. Even when cross-elasticities are zero, a wrong 
set of commodities can be produced, see figures 2 and 3. 
  Figure 2    Different elasticities of demand    Figure 3     Different cost functions 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that high own elasticity commodity A is produced in the Chamberlinian 
equilibrium, where it is socially desirable to produce low own elasticity commodity B, since it 
is marginal. Figure 3 presents a similar analysis for the same demand curve, however, for 
different cost functions. Commodity A has a lower fixed cost, but a higher marginal cost than 
commodity B. Again, commodity A is produced where B is socially desirable, because there is   23 
a much larger consumer surplus. For both cases, we can say that welfare would increase if for 
example the government were to restrict production of A, so B would be viable. Nevertheless, it 
has to be said that the analysis of applications with asymmetry do depend on functional forms 
of the demand and cost schedules. 
 
This section has provided a toolbox of possible extensions of the basic DS model. In particular, 
we have considered: 
 
·  market power and preference-for-diversity as two distinct concepts; 
·  including indirect, price index and income, effects of a price change on output level; 
·  making the elasticity of substitution variable instead of constant and; 
·  the effects of dropping the assumption of symmetry within the monopolistic competitive sector. 
 
Next, we turn to the general oligopolistic competitive model by Neary. 
2.2  Oligopolistic Competition à la Neary 
In large group models, such as the DS model, price and income effects can be neglected in the 
computation of elasticities. However, in small group models, such as oligopolistic competitive 
models, these effects must be accounted for. In addition, firms are likely to interact 
strategically. In the literature of industrial organization, these problems have been discussed 
extensively for partial equilibrium. However, these issues are a lot tougher to treat in general 
equilibrium. The first reason is that, if firms are large in their own market, and if that market 
constitutes a significant segment of the economy, then the firms have a direct influence on 
economy-wide variables. The second reason is that, large firms influence the cost of living, and 
rational shareholders should take this into account in choosing the profit-maximizing level of 
output or price. Many authors interpret this as implying that predictions of general oligopolistic 
equilibrium models are sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. Last, firms in general 
oligopolistic equilibrium commonly have such bad-behaved reaction functions, that models 
cannot be solved. These problems have held back the development of tractable general 
oligopolistic equilibrium models. 
In the literature several attempts were already made to face up with the problems at hand, 
but none of them were successful. Neary (2002) argues that all these problems can be solved in 
a simple matter: firms are large in their industry, but relatively small relative to the whole 
economy. This comes down to assuming a sufficiently large number of sectors. Consequently, 
firms do not influence economy-wide variables. Moreover, profit maximization leads to the 
same real allocation and without Ford effects reaction functions will likely be better behaved. In   24 
his model Neary tries to integrate the industrial organization theory with the theory of general 
equilibrium models. 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss a simple version of the GOLE model by Neary 
(2002) to provide some contrast to the dominant influence of the monopolistic competitive 
model by Dixit and Stiglitz. 
2.2.1  The model 
Demand side 
The key element in Neary’s GOLE model is to assume a sufficiently large number of sectors, in 
which a few firms own the lion’s share of the industry. To keep the analysis as simple as 
possible, we start by assuming an additively separable utility function of a continuum of goods 
for the representative consumer. Neary (2002) uses quadratic preferences that imply linear 
perceived demand curves
10. The utility maximization problem under the budget constraint is 
equivalent to (23). In addition, the inverse demand functions and the marginal utility of income 
are shown in (24). In (24) mp is the mean of the prices and sp
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The key feature of the model is that the marginal utility of income in each sector is taken given 
by firms, and hence the perceived demand curve is linear in (7), but is endogenous in general 
equilibrium. Combined with the assumption of a continuum of sectors, this allows for a 
tractable and consistent approach for modelling oligopolistic competition in general 
equilibrium. 
Supply side 
Consider the same technology as used in the homogenous good sector for the DS model, see 
(7), i.e. labour is the only production factor. Combined with Cournot competition and an 
exogenous given number of firms, n, the first order condition for an individual firm in industry i 
is: 
 
10 Neary (2002) also considers examples of Cobb-Douglas and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. However, Neary shows that these 
specifications do not provide convenient solutions and yield unattractive implications in oligopoly. In particular, Cobb-
Douglas demand functions are extremely restrictive and are inconsistent with profit maximization by a monopolist. Further, 
DS demand functions do not allow that output are often strategic complements in Cournot competition, and reaction 
functions may be non-monotonic.   25 
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Equilibrium 
Solving the system yields equilibrium output and price as in (26). 
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A standard property of additive preferences is that demands are homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices, hence w, and the inverse of marginal utility of income, l
- 1. Besides, the absolute values 
of these nominal variables are indeterminate and of no interest in real models. The homogeneity 
of degree zero ensures that scaling has no effect on the behaviour of the model. Hence, the 
numeraire problem is hereby solved. It is convenient to choose utility as numeraire implying a 
unit marginal utility of income, i.e. l = 1. 
To solve the model completely, we can combine (26) with the labour market clearing 
condition: L
S = ∫0
1 nx(i)/a(i)di, where L
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where ma and sa denote the first two moments of the Ricardian technology distribution, i.e. ma = 
∫0
1a(i)





Neary (2002) examines three issues within a welfare context. Firstly, he examines what the 
effect of more competition is on the functional distribution of income. It appears that when 
competition becomes more active in the sense that the number of firms increases, the share of 
wages in national income also increases. Secondly, he finds a positive effect of competition 
policy on overall welfare, provided sa
2 > ma
2. Consequently, when sa
2 = ma
2, hence all industries 
have the same technology, overall welfare does not increase. Last, Neary shows that aggregate 
welfare and the share of wages need not move together. 
In addition to the welfare analysis for oligopolistic competition, Neary (2003) compares the 
effects with those achieved in monopolistic competition. In particular, he shows that 
competition policy boosts welfare, provided the variance of the technology distribution is 
positive.   26 
2.3  Discussion 
We have seen that the DS specification is extremely tractable and it lends itself easily to general 
equilibrium applications through its homotheticity properties. In addition, it allows 
consideration of the implications of increasing returns to scale and product differentiation in 
general equilibrium. However, these clean functional forms for consumer and producer 
behaviour can be seen as restrictive and impose several special assumptions. Here, I would like 
to point out some of the critiques from Neary (2000), the DS model has received over the years. 
Krugman (1979) showed that product diversity alone can cause gains from trade. In 
particular, when two countries have identical technologies, and open their borders, the number 
of varieties increases, implying consumers are better off. Neary admits variety is important for 
consumers, but questions to what extent. As we have seen, it is possible to divide market power 
and preference-for-diversity as two independent parameters in the DS model. Nevertheless, “it 
clearly fails to capture one of the concerns of anti-globalisation protesters: that liberalising 
trade may reduce rather than increase variety”, as argued by Neary. 
Another disadvantage of using the CES utility function, is that output is given for each firm 
if the elasticity of substitution is given. Hence, trade policy has no influence on firm output. 
However, all changes in industry size are taken care of by the number of firms. This problem 
can be solved by using a variable elasticity utility function as discussed in section 2.1.2. 
However, using this function has a drawback in that we lose some of the tractability. Lawrence 
and Spiller (1983) and Flam and Helpman (1987) relax the assumption of a homothetic 
production function, which leads to changes in equilibrium firm size. 
From an industrial organization point of view, it is curious where entering firms come from 
and exiting firms go to in monopolistic competitive models at all. They imply an unlimited 
supply of atomistic firms, which prove empirically relatively implausible for most industries. 
Finally, the most important critique from the field of industrial organization is that firms 
operate myopic and do not strategically interact with each other. The assumption of myopic 
behaviour can be treated by extending the basic DS model in including indirect effects through 
the discussed approaches by Yang and Heijdra (1993) and d’Aspremont et al. (1996). 
Nevertheless, when the number of firms in a sector is small, hence market power is 
concentrated with a few firms, it is likely that firms behave strategically. 
Neary’s concerns with the DS model are mostly characterized by restrictive assumptions 
and no strategic interaction. He argues what is needed is a general oligopolistic equilibrium 
model, i.e. the model in section 2.2. Actually, the basic idea behind Neary’s GOLE model is the 
same as the DS model. Both models view firms as small in the whole economy, but possess 
monopoly power in their own market. The approach by Neary is, as he puts it himself, “... owes 
a great deal to that of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and in particular to the clarification of its 
theoretical underpinnings provided by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet   27 
(1996).” Indeed, the difference between the models is that the DS model describes a large 
group of firms combined with product differentiation and Neary’s model describes a large 
group of small sectors combined with strategic interaction.  
Obviously, there is no right or wrong model. The choice for a model should depend on the 
application one is concerned with. For our purposes, in particular identifying and describing 
scale economies, we do not need to model strategic interaction between firms. Therefore, we 
can suffice with a tractable and easy to use large group approach like the DS model. 
 
3  Currently applied models 
In section 2, I discussed the two main strands in the imperfect competition literature when it 
comes to general equilibrium modelling. In particular, I presented the classical framework of 
monopolistic competition in general equilibrium by Dixit and Stiglitz and the innovative 
general oligopolistic equilibrium model by Neary. I already concluded, that for our objectives it 
is sufficient to follow a tractable approach like the (large group) DS model. In this section, I 
would like to highlight the aspects of imperfect competition and scale economies in some recent 
applied general equilibrium models. I focus on multi-region models, since WorldScan is a 
global model. In total there are six models, which I discuss in no particular order.  
 
3.1  GTAP model 
GTAP stands for Global Trade Analysis Project and is a global network of researchers and 
policy makers conducting quantitative analysis of international policy issues. The standard 
GTAP model is a multiregion, multisector, computable general equilibrium model, with perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. Besides the standard model, several extensions of the 
model have been produced. One of them, is the inclusion of scale economies and imperfect 
competition in the GTAP model. The discussion that follows, is based on a GTAP working 
paper by Francois and Roland-Holst (FRH) (1996). 
FRH focus on market power, where a class of heterogeneous goods are differentiated by 
country of origin. This is the Armington assumption, see Armington (1969). Further, they 
consider firm-level product differentiation. 
In Armington models, we assume that demand from different goods is aggregated into a 
composite good using a CES specification: 




















,              (28) 
where all variables have the usual interpretation as in the DS model and j denotes the product, i 
the index for region of origin, and r is the index for the region where the product is consumed. 
The Armington specification has almost the same properties as the DS specification
11. 
Therefore we can apply the two-stage-budgeting approach to derive the demand function and 

















































s s e ,        (29) 
where sj = 1 / (1-rj) is the elasticity of substitution and the last term measures market share. 
This last term also shows that price index effects are taken into account. 
Now, we can introduce imperfect competition into the system. One way is to assume that 
firms do not price discriminate, but operate in a single market. This means that firms charge a 
single mark-up. The elasticity of demand in (29) can then be aggregated over regions taking 
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The pricing rule that FRH apply is based on the conjectural variations approach
12 and is given 
by (31). Conjectural variations mean that firms have expectations about other firms reactions to 
a change in their own behaviour. In a mathematical sense, a firm’s conjecture is the derivative 



















,              (31) 
where pji is price, cji is marginal cost, Wji is the conjecture of firm i with respect to the change in 
industry output of firm i’s change in output and n is the number of firms. Actually, (31) is the 
oligopoly pricing rule. In case of monopoly or monopolistic competition, we have Wji / n = 1. 
 
 
11 The only differences are that with the DS model, the number of firms is endogenous and ajir = 1, while in Armington 
models the number of regions and thus the number of varieties is fixed and ajir is in general not equal to one. 
12 For the unfamiliar reader, see Figuières et al. (2004) for a exhaustive discussion of the conjectural variations approach.   29 
Next, we turn to firm-level product differentiation. The specification for the composite good is 
given by (28), where R in the summation should be replaced by n, since we now index, i, over 
firms instead of over regions. The specification resembles very much the DS specification. 
However, the FRH specification still provides a partial geographic anchor for production. The 
rest is analogous to the case of the Armington models: the elasticity of demand is given by (30), 
where k sums to n instead of R and i denotes firm i instead of region of origin i. Note, that this 
specification is identical to (22), the DS elasticity of demand combined with the YH 
approximation, when we assume full symmetry. In addition, free entry and exit of firms is 
assumed, in contrast to the Armington specification. 
FRH also consider a case where the elasticity of demand is somewhat simplified, through 
variety-scaling, by imposing identical cost functions within a region. This means that regional 
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where xjir is the identical consumption in region r of each variety produced in region i. The main 
difference with before is that the CES weights are now endogenous instead of the summation. 
The elasticity of demand then changes to (33). In addition, FRH show that this system of 
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Technology in the GTAP model follows a production ‘tree’. At the bottom of the inverted tree 
are the individual inputs demanded by the firm. These consist of primary production factors on 
the one hand and intermediate inputs produced domestically and abroad on the other. Imported 
inputs follow a nested CES specification. All primary and intermediate inputs are again nested 
in a Leontief (perfect complementarity) specification. 
FRH illustrate the workings of the model with an aggregation of version 3 of the GTAP 
database. As a measure for market power FRH apply a so-called cost-disadvantage-ratio (CDR), 
which is equivalent to fixed costs divided by total costs. CDR estimates are representative for 
typical reported CDR values, as presented in e.g. Pratten (1988). Furthermore, they assume that 
conjectural variations Wji / n take values 0.2 and 0.5, equivalent with respectively 5 and 2 firms 
in Cournot competition. The mark-ups are derived from a 1992 benchmark dataset.   30 
Concluding, FRH present a menu of relatively standard specifications of imperfect competition 
and scale economies. They consider two ways of differentiating products: by origin and by 
variety. The first is primarily based on the Armington assumption and a fixed number of firms. 
The second is a combination of a standard CES specification for product differentiation with an 
endogenous number of firms and a partial geographical anchor. In either case, price index 
effects are accounted for. Besides, they also considered some practical simplifications in the 
form of operations in a single market and variety-scaling. 
3.2  MIRAGE 
MIRAGE stands for Modelling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium and 
is a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model, devoted to trade policy 
analysis, as is the GTAP model. It incorporates imperfect competition, product differentiation 
by variety and by quality, and foreign direct investment, in a sequential dynamic set-up where 
installed capital is assumed to be immobile. The succeeding description of the imperfect 
competitive properties of the model come from Bchir et al. (2002). 
MIRAGE describes imperfect competition in an oligopolistic framework à la Cournot. It 
accounts for horizontal product differentiation linked to varieties, but also to geographical 
origin (nested Armington - Dixit-Stiglitz utility function). Since Harris (1984)
13, imperfect 
competition and horizontal product differentiation are commonly incorporated, notably based 
on the formalisations proposed by Smith and Venables (1988), and by Harrison, Rutherford and 
Tarr (1997). In fact, imperfect competition, scale economies and product differentiation are 
reasonably similarly modelled as in the GTAP model. The primary difference is that GTAP has 
been heavily engaged in data work to make these models easier accessible.  
At the demand side of MIRAGE consumption is modelled in each region through a 
representative agent. Utility is modelled as a nested Armington - Dixit-Stiglitz function as the 
one used in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997)
14. In particular, domestic demand is modelled 
using the DS specification, import demand is modelled using a traditional Armington 
specification and both demands are aggregated in a Cobb-Douglas utility function. However, 
this specification does not allow for vertical differentiation nor for specialisation in quality. The 
utility function could be extended by adding a further CES nesting level distinguishing between 
quality ranges. The elasticity of demand of firms in region r selling region r’ is equal to the 
inverse of (34), 
 
13 Harris (1984) describes consumer demand by a blend of Armington-type and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Overall utility is 
Cobb-Douglas and is indexed over perfect and imperfect competitive sectors. Perfect competitive sectors are described by a 
Armington-type function and imperfect competitive sectors by a DS specification. Harris’ specification introduces a certain 
asymmetry in consumer preferences. Perfect competitive commodities have different preference weights in the composite 
quantity index, while imperfect competitive commodities do not. 
14 This is where FRH en MIRAGE do differ. While MIRAGE use a nested Armington – DS function for utility, FRH use a non-
nested version.   31 
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where qrr’ is the market share of firms from region r in country r’, qr
M is the market share of 
imports in region r, sDD, sDM and sMM are trade elasticities of substitution between domestic 
and imported goods. 
At the supply side of the model, technology can be of constant and increasing returns to 
scale and follows almost the same production tree as in the GTAP model. The only difference is 
that intermediate consumption here does not distinguish between domestic and imported goods. 
As usual, scale economies are modelled by a fixed cost implying a decreasing average cost 
curve. Firms behave as oligopolists and compete in a Cournot-Nash way. In principle, the 
pricing rule in (31) also applies here. Furthermore, as in the GTAP model, firms rule out the 
Ford effect. However, they do take into account their market power, that is the influence they 
may exert on the sectoral composite price index. Bchir et al. (2002) advocate a binary approach 
for the number of firms in the model. The binary approach describes the number of firms 
constant and profits variable in the short run, while assuming free entry and exit and zero profits 
in the long run. 
The GTAP 5 database (see Dimanaran and MacDougall, 2002) is used as the major dataset. 
Although some parameters in the model can be freely chosen, several others have to be 
calibrated, i.e. the elasticity of substitution, economies of scale and competition intensity. The 
Armington elasticities are drawn from the GTAP 5 database, and are assumed to be identical 
across regions. The other elasticities used in the nesting for a given sector are linked to the 
Armington elasticity by subtracting one and dividing/multiplying by Ö2 when moving 
upward/downward and then adding one. Economies of scale are linked to the mark-up ratio, for 
which estimates exist for industrial sectors (see Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta, 1999), for 
service sectors (see Oliveira-Martins, Pilat and Scarpetta, 1996) and for both (see Roeger, 
1995). Estimates for the number of firms are based on Davies and Lyons (1996). In addition, 
Bchir et al. (2002) argue that firms are not direct competitors to each other within a sector. 
Therefore, they postulate subsectors. When assuming that each sector has one type of 
competition, this problem does not exist, and estimates from Gasiorek, Smith and Venables 
(1992) can be used. Calibration issues are discusses in more detail in Annex 2. 
Summarizing, imperfect competition and scale economies are modelled in a relatively 
standard fashion in MIRAGE. Scale economies are described by a decreasing average cost 
curve. Firms behave as oligopolists and choose their output strategically, taking into account 
their influence on the composite price index. Furthermore, product and regional differentiation   32 
are allowed for through nested DS-Armington preferences by a representative consumer. The 
number of firms is controlled for in a binary fashion. 
3.3  ATHENA model 
For sector-specific macro-economic analyses in the Dutch economy, CPB uses the “ATHENA” 
model. The model consists of an explicit input-output matrix for several branches of industry 
and institutional sectors. The basic design of the model follows the bottom-up approach, where 
macro-economic aggregates are derived by adding the sectoral outcomes. The specification of 
each individual sector is similar to that of conventional macro-econometric models. The 
production process requires the use of primary production factors and intermediate inputs 
provided by one domestic and one foreign supplier. Factor demand equations are driven by 
gross output and own real prices and price information is modelled as a mark-up on marginal 
costs. Consumption at the macro-level is largely driven by disposable income and consumer 
demand at the sectoral level follows from a two-stage-budgeting allocation procedure. 
Concerning calibration, the elasticities in the ATHENA model are chosen rather arbitrary. 
Further, the number of firms are based on a Herfindahl index and CBS data. The inverse 
Herfindahl index represents the number of hypothetical symmetric, equal-sized firms which 
would result in the same concentration level as the actually observed level. Last, the mark-ups 
are determined by the CDRs based on a study by Oliveira-Martins, Pilat and Scarpetta (1996), 
as is the case in MIRAGE. 
As argued by Neary (2000), most markets feature a small number of firms competing 
strategically with each other and with potential entrants. The game-theoretic equilibria that 
result are often non-unique and highly dependent on specific details of the market structure. A 
very high level of disaggregation is therefore required to capture these aspects of imperfect 
competition. Broer et al. (2003) avoid these complications in the ATHENA model by assuming 
that the market operates in monopolistic competition. In particular, they adopt the basic DS 
model, assume free and exit of firms and distinguish between love-of-variety and market power 
according to section 2.1.2. Obviously, this needs no further explanation. One particular 
difference with the above models is that ATHENA is a national model. Hence, no Armington 
specification is required to model imports. 
3.4  LINKAGE model 
The LINKAGE model is a global, multi-region, multi-sector, recursive dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model, see Mensbrugghe (2003). It is a neo-classical model with both 
factor and goods market clearing. Trade is modelled using nested Armington and production 
transformation structures to determine bilateral trade flows.   33 
All sectors are assumed to operate under cost minimization. The model allows for increasing 
returns to scale using fixed production costs, which are represented by some fixed combination 
of capital and labour. Currently, the model assumes a fixed mark-up, uniform for each region, 
and endogenous profits. So in fact, the LINKAGE model follows a standard DS specification 
with a fixed number of firms. In a future version the model will allow for free entry and exit of 
firms. Marginal costs are modelled by a series of nested CES production functions, that are 
intended to represent the different substitution and complementary relations across the various 
inputs in each sector. In particular, Mensbrugghe (2003) advocates the use of a sequence of 
CES functions, because it is easy to implement and understand. An alternative might be to use 
so-called flexible functional forms, which in some sense can be thought of as a functional 
(Taylor) approximation of the true technological relations and is calibrated to a given set of own 
and cross price elasticities. Technology is specified the same as in the GTAP model. 
All income generated by economic activity is assumed to be distributed to consumers. A 
single representative consumer allocates optimally his disposable income among commodities 
and saving. 
Imports originating in different regions are imperfect substitutes, i.e. imports are specified 
based on the Armington assumption. The Armington specification is implemented using two 
CES nests. At the top nest, domestic agents choose the optimal combination of the domestic 
good and an aggregate import good consistent with the agent’s preference function. At the 
second nest, agents optimally allocate demand for the aggregate import good across the range of 
trading partners. 
The bilateral supply of exports is specified in parallel fashion using a nesting of constant-
elasticity-of-transformation (CET) functions. At the top nest, domestic suppliers optimally 
allocate aggregate supply across the domestic market and the aggregate export market. At the 
second nest, aggregate export supply is optimally allocated across each trading region as a 
function of relative prices. 
The LINKAGE model is mainly based on the GTAP 5 version 4 database. This version has 
a 1997 base year. Calibration in the model occurs in a separate routine. Unfortunately, this 
procedure is not explicitly discussed in Mensbrugghe (2003). 
In short, scale economies are modelled through a standard decreasing average cost curve 
and imperfect competition is again modelled in a nested Armington-DS fashion as in MIRAGE. 
In addition, the model allows for short-run as well as long-run Armington elasticities, i.e. it 
introduces the possibility of more flexible long-term responses to changes in import prices. 
Technology is modelled in a nested sequence of CES functions along the lines of the GTAP 
model. Furthermore, the number of firms is fixed and profits may vary.   34 
3.5  Michigan model 
The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade is a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) modelling framework originally developed starting in the mid 1970s by Alan Deardorff 
and Robert Stern at the University of Michigan
15. The model was used for a variety of purposes 
in addition to the Tokyo Round, including analyzing the effects of exchange rate changes, the 
structure of protection, and scenarios of trade liberalization leading up to the Uruguay Round.  
In the late 1980's, Robert Stern collaborated with Drusilla Brown of Tufts University to 
construct a model of the United States and Canada for the purpose of analyzing the effects of 
the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. They started with the structure of the Michigan Model, 
but extended its equations to include features of the New Trade Theory: imperfect competition, 
increasing returns to scale, and product differentiation. Shortly after, joined again by Alan 
Deardorff, they expanded this model to include first four and then eight countries and country 
groups that could be selected in different combinations from the 34-country Michigan Model 
database. This model, which we now call the Michigan Brown-Deardorff-Stern (BDS) Model, 
retains the features of the new trade theory introduced by Brown and Stern.  
Turning to the market structure, some sectors are modelled as perfectly competitive but 
most sectors as monopolistically competitive with free entry and exit of firms. Firms charge a 
mark-up which is identical for all regions. In general, a standard DS specification is used to 
accommodate imperfect competition and scale economies. In some versions of the Michigan 
model, to incorporate multinational firms, nested CES functions are used to differentiate 
between domestic and import demand. 
Consumers and producers are assumed to use a two-stage procedure to allocate expenditure 
across differentiated products. In the first stage, expenditure is allocated across goods without 
regard to the country of origin or producing firm. At this stage, the utility function is Cobb-
Douglas, and the production function requires intermediate inputs in fixed proportions. In the 
second stage, expenditure on monopolistically competitive goods is allocated across the 
competing varieties supplied by each firm from all countries. In the case of sectors that are 
perfectly competitive, since individual firm supply is indeterminate, expenditure is allocated 
over each country’s industry as a whole, with imperfect substitution between products of 
different countries. The aggregation function in the second stage is a CES function. 
The production function is separated into two stages. In the first stage, intermediate inputs 
and a primary composite of capital and labour are used in fixed proportion to output. In the 
second stage, capital and labour are combined through a CES function to form the primary 
composite. In the monopolistically competitive sectors, additional fixed inputs of capital and 
labour are required. It is assumed that fixed capital and fixed labour are used in the same 
proportion as variable capital and variable labour so that production functions are homothetic. 
 
15 For a detailed description and history of the model, see http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model.   35 
It is unclear how calibration is treated in the Michigan model. On their website they say that 
their section on the data is “seriously incomplete”. Nevertheless, they do say that elasticities are 
reproduced from Deardoff and Stern (1990). However, they do not describe how. 
 
3.6  Willenbockel 
Willenbockel (1994) indicated some unsatisfactory features of previous economic evaluations 
of the EC internal market completion programme and suggested a modified Harris-type multi-
sectoral general equilibrium framework. This framework allows for the presence of imperfectly 
competitive markets, intra-industry product differentiation and economies of scale. 
As in case of the previous discussed models, Willenbockel considers both perfect and 
imperfect competitive sectors. Technology are those of constant returns to scale and decreasing 
average cost curves and applies the same production tree as in the GTAP model. Furthermore, 
he considers various types of non-cooperative firm behaviour: Betrand price-setting, Cournot 
quantity-setting and Chamberlinian price setting. 
At the demand side of the model, utility is that of a representative consumer, and follows a 
three-stage-budgeting approach. At the top CES nest, the representative consumer in the 
economy, draws utility from sectoral composite goods. The lower nest is characterized by 
variety-scaling as in (32). Hence, the number of firms is endogenous and indirect price index 
effects are taken care off. 
The CGE model is calibrated to a consolidated dataset, which reflects the levels and 
structure of UK production, demand and trade flows for the benchmark period 1985. The 
number of symmetric domestic firms in imperfect competitive industries is determined by the 
reciprocals of Herfindahl concentration indices derived on the basis of the observed 1985 size 
distribution of firms by industry provided in Department of Trade and Industry - Business 
Statistics Office (1988). Just like in the GTAP model, also here, Pratten (1988) is used for 
estimates of the CDRs. Elasticities are chosen rather arbitrary: between 0 and 1.5 for service 
and primary sectors and 2.5 for manufacturing sectors. 
Concluding, the general equilibrium model developed by Willenbockel is closely related to 
the extended GTAP model, discussed in section 3.1. 
3.7  Summary 
The models in section 2 are mainly theoretical, but provide the foundation for applied models. 
In this section, I discussed several general equilibrium models of the last five to ten years. 
Almost all models are multi-region models. Therefore, the specifications used in these models 
stem from the international trade literature.    36 
The main characteristics are summarized in Table 3.1. We have seen that all models describe 
increasing returns technologies by decreasing average cost curves, assume homotheticity and 
follow a nested sequence of CES functions including primary and intermediate inputs. For all 
models we have increasing returns at the sectoral level. The ATHENA model can also 
distinguish between returns to diversity and ease of substitution. Because of this property, 
ATHENA has the ability to turn the love-of-variety effect off and have constant returns to scale 
at the sectoral level, while maintaining mark-up pricing due to fixed costs.  
Furthermore, firms generally behave as oligopolists à la Cournot. However, monopolistic 
competition is considered as a border case of oligopoly, where the number of firms becomes 
relatively large. In the oligopoly pricing rule, this means that firms conjectures, W/n, equal one. 
Further, most models do not allow price discrimination amongst regions. In general, full price 
discrimination leads to numerical complexity, because of the following large number of 
elasticities of demand. 
Consumer demand is preferably described as a blend of Armington-type and Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences. In this way, goods are both differentiated with respect to origin and variety. There 
are a number of possible specifications: 
  
·  The Harris-type describes demand in perfect competitive industries by Armington preferences 
and imperfect competitive industries by DS preferences. This yields a certain asymmetry in the 
preference weights.  
·  Another specification is the one used in MIRAGE, where domestic demand is of the DS type 
and import demand is of the Armington type.  
·  Yet another specification is variety-scaling as applied in the GTAP model and Willenbockel 
(1994). Variety-scaling imposes symmetry on the cost functions within a region. This means 
that regional firms produce the same quantity and charge the same price. Furthermore, 
Armington and DS preferences are not nested as in MIRAGE. 
  
Several extensions of these demand systems can be thought off. One of them is to allow for 
different Armington elasticities to be used for the short-run and long-run as in the LINKAGE 
model. This introduces the possibility of more flexible long-term responses to changes in import 
prices. Except for the ATHENA model, all models take into account the indirect effect of a 
change in price on the sectoral price index. However, they all ignore Ford effects. 
Concerning calibration, the number of firms is often determined by a Herfindahl index. The 
degree of market power is generally determined by estimated mark-up ratios from studies of 
Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta (1999), Oliveira-Martins, Pilat and Scarpetta (1996) and Roeger 
(1995) or cost-disadvantage-ratios from Pratten (1988). Elasticities are often chosen arbitrary or 
proportionate to some given input-output matrix.   37 
In the next chapter I give a recommendation for modelling scale economies and imperfect 
competition in WorldScan based on the knowledge of the two previous chapters and the 
objectives at hand. Moreover, I run some simulations to analyze the effects of introducing a 
new technology and market structure. 
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4  Scale economies in WorldScan 
4.1  Modelling approach 
Previous subsections have shown that many possibilities to incorporate scale economies in 
WorldScan do exist. However, the objective of this memorandum is not finding the most 
extensive model specification for imperfect competition and scale economies, but finding one 
that can mainly identify and describe increasing returns. In order to quickly have an operational 
version of WorldScan, I follow a practical approach. 
The precise model specification is discussed in section 4.1.1. Calibration issues are 
discussed in section 4.1.2. In short, the model adjustments are the following: 
 
·  Dixit-Stiglitz - Armington demand specification: we would like to model heterogeneity at the 
supply side of the model to represent the large trade in semi manufactured products, also to 
accommodate agglomeration effects. Unfortunately, it would take too much work to adjust the 
model in this way given time. For now, heterogeneity is modelled at the demand side of the 
model using a nested Dixit-Stiglitz - Armington structure. 
·  Variety scaling: uniform production technology for all firms in a certain sector for a certain 
region. 
·  Free entry and exit of firms: when profits are positive, this will attract new entrants to the 
market. When they are negative, firms will go inactive and exit the market. In the long run firms 
earn zero profit. Any profit is still counted as income such that the option for an exogenous 
number of firms can be added easily at a later time. Nevertheless, an exogenous number of 
firms has the odd property that some firms still produce while incurring losses. 
·  Monopolistic competition: with indirect effects of a price change on the price index and income 
ignored, since the number of firms is assumed to be sufficiently large. Strategic interaction 
between firms is not needed to show the effects of increasing returns, and thus modelling an 
oligopolistic market structure is not needed. Monopolistic competition is easier to model. 
·  Distinguish between love-of-variety and ease of substitution: it has been argued that these are 
two distinct phenomena. Therefore we would like to model them separately. This is easily 
accomplished. Furthermore, in this way, the welfare effects of the number of varieties can be 
‘turned off’. 
·  Mill-pricing: firms demand a fixed producer price independent of the region of destination. 
 
Summarizing, we could say that the approach above is a mix of the imperfect competitive 
model aspects from ATHENA and MIRAGE. Although the model could be extended in many 
ways, the current approach is sufficient to meet our demands. The following two subsections 
discuss the model and calibration of the parameters.   40 
4.1.1  The Model 
Let us define the following variables and indices: 
  p = price        v = firm level 
  x = quantity        0 = raw / semi-manufacturing level 
  n = number of firms      i = firm i 
  ε = elasticity of demand      j = sector of production 
  f = fixed costs        r = region of production 
  t = tariff and transportation costs    s = region of consumption 
Consider a composite input, xjr, that is a CES-aggregate of njr different varieties x
v
jir originating 
from a specific industry 
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Note that, we distinguish between love-of-variety and ease of substitution by including the 
additional parameter qj, which controls for love-of-variety; qj = 1 and qj = ej/(ej- 1) correspond 
to the extreme cases ‘no love-of-variety’ and ‘maximum love-of-variety’. 
Customers buy the brand aggregate (35) at minimal costs. Hence, they minimize unit costs 
of (35), pjr, with respect to individual brands, x
v
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It is straightforward to show that the resulting demand for variety i with corresponding price 
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where the brand aggregate, xjr, is determined elsewhere in the model. Let us assume firms are 
identical. Hence, firms produce the same quantity, x
v
jr, and charge the same price, p
v
jr. 
Therefore we drop index i. The result is that (37) greatly simplifies to (38). 
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Let us assume that firms within the industry produce a so called ‘raw output’, which has the 
interpretation of a semi-manufactured output, x
v,0
jr, under constant-returns-to-scale, using 
composite inputs and factor services at a unit cost, p
0
jr. Note that, sectoral raw output is equal to 









of this raw output to produce x
v
jr units of a single variety. In other words, raw output denotes 
what all firms produce in terms of costs. This output is not sold. The raw output is an input for a 
very simple production process, where a part is used as a set-up cost and the rest is sold on the 
market. The part that is sold is obviously less than raw output in terms of quantity. However, in 
terms of value, these are exactly equal because the quantity on the market is sold at a producer 
price, p
0
jr, plus a mark-up, p
0
jr/(ej- 1) that covers the raw output that is used as set-up cost. 
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It can be shown, that if n is large, the demand elasticities are approximately fixed and equal to -
εj for all varieties in sector j. Assuming a large number of firms, a monopolistic firm can ignore 
strategic behaviour by competitors. Each firm determines the price of its brand by maximizing 
profits 
 


































































.     (41) 
 
Thus, firms set a price equal to marginal costs plus a mark-up. 
Let us assume firms can enter and exit an industry freely. Then, as long as profits are 
positive, firms offering new varieties will enter the market. On the other hand, if profits are 
negative, firms incur a loss, and exit the market. In the long run, these dynamics drive profits to 
zero. Hence, in equilibrium price equals average costs 
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Substituting (41) in (42) yields the equilibrium firm output level 
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This solves the imperfect competitive model. Summarizing, the first order conditions of the 
model are 
 















































This is combined with the Armington specification as follows. Prices in region of consumption 
s of products produced in region r are equal to 
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where p times t represent the tariff and transportation costs. Consequently, the Armington 
specification follows via 
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Two important remarks should be made here. Firstly, note that individual varieties are 
transported and not the aggregate of all brands together. The increasing-returns-to-scale effects 
occur in the country where varieties are consumed and the transport costs should not be affected 
by the love-of-variety of consumers in the destination country. Secondly, the Armington 
elasticity in (46) should be smaller than the DS elasticity: sj < ej, for the model to have an 
interior solution. Ignoring this restriction may lead to corner solutions or numerical problems 
when solving the model.  
4.1.2  Calibration 
Issues concerning calibration are heavily discussed in Annex 1. Calibration for this imperfect 
competitive model is particularly easy. Only two parameters have to be calibrated. These are the 
sectoral elasticities of demand and the fixed costs
16.  
Elasticities are given by rewriting estimated mark-ups in Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta 
(1996a, 1996b). If these elasticities are lower than the Armington elasticities they are set 
slightly higher than the relevant Armington elasticity. 
Fixed costs are determined by (44), where raw output is given by GTAP data and the 
number of firms is set equal to one for the EU. For the other regions it is determined in such a 
way, that fixed costs are equal over regions. Basically, we do not know anything about 
differences between regions, so therefore we equalize them. Using Herfindahl indices to 
calibrate the number of firms is also possible. However, Eurostat data show that the sectoral 
numbers of firms can be very large. This causes numerical problems in the calibration 
procedure not to mention the peculiar side effects, see Erp, et al. (2001). Therefore we scale the 
number of firms. This alters the interpretation of the variable n, though. Now, n is interpreted as 
an index rather as the absolute number of firms. The same holds for the fixed costs and brand 
quantity, since these variables change accordingly. However, a time series of these three 
variables still shows the relative change. 
4.2  Simulations 
Before we implement the imperfect competitive modelling approach chosen in the previous 
section in WorldScan, it may be useful to analyze the effects in an aggregated version. This will 
be the objective of this section.  
This section is structured as follows. Firstly, I analyze the effects, when increasing returns to 
scale at firm level are introduced compared to a base run with constant returns to scale
17. Here, I 
 
16 The love-of-variety parameter, q, is not calibrated in the model. We just set it equal to the mark-up for pure love-of-variety 
or equal to 0 to turn it off. It might be interesting to also consider other values to change the degree of the economies of 
scale. However, as far as I know, there are no empirical studies, yet, which estimate the love-of-variety by consumers. 
Therefore, I stick with the two cases of pure and no love-of-variety.   44 
allow for the love-of-variety effect, hence we set qj = ej/(ej- 1) in (35) and follow the basic DS 
model. Therefore, we also have increasing returns at the sectoral level. 
Secondly, I turn the love-of-variety effect off, by setting qj = 1 in (35). In this scenario, we 
have constant returns to scale at the sectoral level, while maintaining mark-up pricing due to 
fixed costs. 
And finally, I simulate a liberalisation variant by gradually reducing import tariffs over time 
until they are non-existent. Here, it is interesting to see where specialisation patterns occur and 
how these differ between constant and increasing returns to scale technologies. 
 This aggregated version of WorldScan is exactly the same as the ‘core-version’
18 of 
WorldScan. However, here we consider only five sectors, i.e. agriculture, energy, 
manufacturing, services and transport and three regions, i.e. EU, rest of OECD and rest of the 
world.  Calibration is done for 2001 and I simulate yearly until 2040. The analysis focuses on 
the long run effects, say the effects in 2040.  
4.2.1  Standard Dixit-Stiglitz: pure love-of-variety 
To profoundly understand the workings of increasing returns, I go step by step with introducing 
scale economies. Firstly I simulate four scenarios in which one sector features increasing 
returns in the EU. The agricultural sector features constant returns, because this is more 
realistic. Changing the production technology for one particular sector in one particular region 
is the smallest possible variation on the case of constant returns. Hence, in this way we are able 
to analyze the direct effects of introducing increasing returns. Furthermore, we can analyze the 
differences between sectors.  
Secondly, I simulate increasing returns in a single sector for different regions. 
Manufacturing is chosen arbitrarily here. Besides the EU I also consider increasing returns in 
the rest of the OECD, all OECD regions together and OECD and non-OECD regions together to 
look at regional effects. Note that I do not differentiate mark-ups between regions. Still, 
regional differentiation is possible.  
Thirdly, I look at a variant where all sectors but agriculture and all regions feature increasing 
returns. This variant corresponds most with reality and is thus the one that will be most likely 
implemented in WorldScan.  
Fourthly, I look at the effects of halving the elasticity of demand in the manufacturing sector 
in the EU in the one-sector-increasing-returns case. Fixed costs are calibrated once more. This 
test serves as a sensitivity analysis to the parameters.  
                                                                                                                                                          
17 We simulate constant returns to scale with the DS model, by using a demand elasticity equal to ten billion. Differences 
with true constant returns to scale are approximately zero. Therefore, DS technology with demand elasticities equal to ten 
billion is a good proxy for constant returns to scale. 
18 The core version of WorldScan excludes research and development and does not distinguish between short and long 
term Armington elasticities.   45 
Finally, it is interesting to see what the effects of giving firms more market power will be, by 
again halving the elasticity of demand but now holding fixed costs fixed.  
The simulations will be discussed in turn. I begin with the observations about the 
simulations of the one-sector-increasing-returns case. All results are summarized in Annex 2. 
Single region, single sector case 
In the constant returns case we see that the number of firms is not equal to one as you initially 
would expect. A time path of the simulation with constant returns shows that the number of 
firms is equal to one in the base year, 2001. From 2001 onwards the number of firms increases 
gradually to a value of 1.79. Because firm output is fixed, raw output increases. This rise is 
caused by lower input prices, which again are the result of technological progress and increased 
labour supply. 
Because the mark-up approaches zero in the constant-returns-case, firm price is equal to 
sectoral price and in turn is equal to marginal costs. 
Increasing returns are introduced by lowering the elasticity to a value of 7.5 yielding higher 
fixed costs. On the one hand, firms lower their producer price (- 3%), because they can produce 
more efficiently due to increasing returns. On the other hand, they tend to produce more 
because they have to cover their fixed costs (+ 12%). Higher production leads to a higher 
demand for production factors and therefore to higher factor prices (+ 22%). 
The effect on the number of firms is determined by respectively firm output (0%), fixed 
costs (813) and raw output
19 (+ 18%). Notice that total production (read output plus fixed cost) 
of the firm increases by (813 + 5285) / 5285 - 1 ≈ + 16%. The difference in growth of raw 
output and growth of firm production is growth in the number of firms, + 2%. 
The manufacturing sector not only demands more production factors but also more 
intermediate inputs from the other sectors. These sectors react by increasing their producer 
prices and de facto a decreasing raw producer price. De facto, the aggregate raw producer price 
falls (- 8%). Because of the mark-up (7.5 / 6.5 ≈ 1.15) the firm price increases by about 6%. 
Essentially, the message is that increasing returns affect producer prices: it lowers the input 
price of the “increasing-returns-sector” and increases all other producer prices, especially factor 
prices. 
The third column considers a further decrease in the elasticity of demand. Hence mark-ups 
over marginal costs increase and all effects on producer prices are even stronger than before. 
Here, we see that the number of firms does not increase much, although mark-ups have 
increased dramatically. The reason is that fixed costs have more than doubled while raw output 
increased by 40%. 
 
19 From now on, when we talk about raw output, we talk about raw output at the sectoral level, hence x
0
jr in (44).   46 
Table 4.1  Simulation results for manufacturing sector in EU 
Year 2040  constant returns  increasing returns in manufacturing EU 
         
      half ε  half ε, keep µ fixed 
         
elasticity of demand  1E+10  7.5  3.75  3.75 
fixed cost per firm  5.3E-7  813  1922  813 
number of firms  1.79  + 2%  + 3%  + 143% 
firm output  5285  0%  0%  - 58% 
composite output  9486  + 12%  + 29%  + 76% 
raw output  9486  + 18%  + 40%  + 40% 
firm output price  0.71  + 6%  + 15%  + 15% 
composite price  0.71  - 3%  - 8%  - 32% 
raw producer price  0.71  - 8%  - 15%  - 15% 
factor price  1.00  + 22%  + 59%  + 59% 
producer price agricul.  0.67  + 6%  + 15%  + 15% 
producer price energy  1.53  + 5%  + 13%  + 13% 
producer price manuf.  0.71  - 3%  - 6%  - 6% 
producer price services  1.22  + 6%  + 14%  + 14% 
producer price transport  0.81  + 8%  + 19%  + 19% 
         
Note: composite variables are CES aggregates (including the love-of-variety effect). Raw output denotes semi-manufactured sectoral 
output of a constant-returns-to-scale production process. Raw output is equal to firm output plus the set-up cost and the outcome of that 
multiplied with the number of firms in the sector. 
 
The last column shows the results of a test which examines what happens when firms set higher 
mark-ups over marginal costs holding fixed costs in the sector at the same level (compared to 
column 2) Intuitively, firms get more market power. The number of firms increases 
dramatically (+ 143%), because new firms enter the market to profit from the relatively high 
mark-ups. Consequently, firms individually produce less (- 58%) since demand has not 
increased that much (+ 40% - + 18% = + 22%). Because of the high mark-up raw producer 
prices are reduced further (- 15% - - 8% = - 7%) and production is increased leading to higher 
input prices.  
Alternatively, column 4 can be seen as a test of lowering the fixed costs holding the 
elasticity of demand at the same level (compared to the third column). Now, only two variables 
change in value. Lowering fixed costs in the sector attracts entering firms leading to a dramatic 
increase in firms (+ 143%). The elasticity of demand is the same as before, thus, demand has 
not changed. Therefore, output per firm falls to compensate for the increase in firms. 
Furthermore, composite output and price also change because of the change in the number of 
firms. The love-of-variety effect becomes stronger. 
Concluding, an increase in the demand elasticity changes the demand structure and therefore 
the cost structure. Effects of increasing returns get stronger, because firms get more market 
power. A decrease in fixed costs leads to an increase in the number of firms and reduces firm 
output implying economies of scale.   47 
Because of trade there are spillovers to other regions. However, in general these effects are 
small. 
Single region, multi sector case 
Since demand elasticities are much lower in the services and transport sector, mark-ups are 
much higher. Hence, firms have more market power. Fixed costs for the energy and transport 
sector are much smaller, respectively 62 and 257, while for the services sector much larger, 
2780, compared to the manufacturing sector, see Table A1 in Annex 2. These differences in 
fixed costs determine for the most part the differences for the other variables. The energy and 
transport sector attract more firms while the services sector attracts less firms relative to the 
manufacturing sector because firms in the energy and transport sector have far lower set-up 
costs than in the services sector. Because firm output does not change, the same effects hold for 
sectoral raw output. The energy and transports sector also have the highest increase in 
composite output. Hence, although firms in the services sector set the same mark-ups as the 
transport sector and far higher mark-ups compared to the energy sector, the difference in fixed 
cost plays a far more important role in the love-of-variety effect (scaling firm output with n
e/(e-
1)), since the number of firms increases dramatically. This, we already noticed in Table 4.1. 
Furthermore, notice that the effects in the energy sector and the transport sector do not differ 
much from each other. One part of the explanation is the difference in fixed cost, i.e. for the 
transport sector 257 and for the energy sector only 62. The other part is a difference in cost 
shares in the raw producer price for different sectors. Indeed, the cost shares are highest for the 
energy sector. Sometimes this cost share is twice as large as for other sectors. Hence, the energy 
price is not only important for the raw output price in the energy sector itself, but also very 
important for other sectors. 
Multi region, single sector case 
There is no differentiation between regions in elasticities and fixed costs. Introducing increasing 
returns in all regions shows that the effects are largest for the rest of the world. For example 
factor prices are several times larger than in other regions, see column “manufac. all” in Table 
A7 in Annex 2. The main reason is that economic growth in the rest of the world is on average 
three times as large as for the EU and rest of OECD. In fact, when we target economic growth 
at a 1% growth rate for all regions, variation between regions gets significantly smaller. 
Although raw output prices fall and firms receive more market power, this does not lead to 
entering firms to the market. In fact, when increasing returns is also introduced in the rest of the 
world the number of firms decreases for all three increasing returns regions for the 
manufacturing sector, see column “manufac. all” in Table A10 in Annex 1. Why?  
The number of firms depends on three things, raw output, firm output and fixed costs. Since 
firm output is constant for all variants, only raw output and fixed costs matter. Therefore, it has   48 
to hold that raw output does not increase enough (or even decreases) to compensate the increase 
in firm production caused by the fixed costs. What is the underlying process?  
Because of fixed costs, firms have to produce more to ensure zero profit. Because of this, 
firms demand more inputs, i.e. production factors and intermediate inputs. Higher demand leads 
to higher prices. Therefore, inputs become more expensive. As a result, the raw output price 
may even increase due to increasing returns, because other inputs besides your own become 
more expensive. Because firms have to make zero profit, and face high input prices, firms 
cannot produce enough to compensate for the fixed costs and exit the market until firms in the 
market make zero profit. 
Thus, when increasing returns is introduced in the rest of the world, demand for inputs 
increases dramatically, because it is such a large region. Moreover, the rest of the world has an 
economic growth rate which is three times larger than that of the EU and rest of OECD. Hence, 
other sector’s producer prices and especially factor prices shoot up causing losses for firms. 
This leads to exiting firms until the market is in equilibrium. 
Multi region, multi sector case 
In this variant where increasing returns is introduced everywhere where possible, all previously 
discussed effects hold. In particular, the underlying processes are the same. 
The fall in the number of firms as discussed in the previous paragraph also holds here. In 
fact, the numbers are more extreme. In all sectors for all regions the number of firms fall as a 
result of increasing returns (see column “all sectors” in Table A10 in Annex 2). Furthermore, all 
factor prices shoot up dramatically with tens sometimes hundreds of percentages (see same 
column in Table A7 in Annex 2). The effects on raw producer prices vary across sectors. They 
increase for agriculture, energy and manufacturing. It appears the mark-up over marginal cost is 
not enough to compensate for the high input prices next to the fixed costs. The other sectors 
show a decrease in the raw producer prices. The mark-ups for those sectors are much higher and 
can compensate the high input prices. 
Summary 
The main effects of the introduction of increasing returns appear in the cost structure: “own 
input” price decreases and “other intermediate input” prices and factor prices increase. 
Depending on which effect is stronger, this leads to entering/exiting firms to/from the market. 
Figure 4 illustrates what happens when increasing returns are introduced. In general, sectors 
with large market power, i.e. demanding a high mark-up, have firms entering the market. 
Sectors with small market power, i.e. demanding a small mark-up, have firms exiting the 
market. Increasing returns in many sectors and/or regions can cause a drain on production 
factors and intermediate inputs and therefore an outflow of firms in all sectors and regions. The 
degree of economies of scale is influenced by the mark-up and the fixed cost. In particular,   49 
halving the fixed cost induces relatively more increasing returns than halving the demand 
elasticity. Concluding, the effects of introducing increasing returns to WorldScan are 
significant!   50 
Figure 4  Introducing increasing returns 
























4.2.2  Different degrees of love-of-variety 
This section addresses the love-of-variety effect. In particular, how does tuning love-of-variety 
affect the results obtained from simulations with the basic DS model? Unfortunately, there exist 
no empirical studies that estimate the love-of-variety parameter. Therefore, as a sensitivity 
exercise, here we consider the extreme case of no love-of-variety. 
From theory we then know the following (see sections 2.1.2 and 4.1.1). The composite 
brands price is equal to the individual brand price and the brands output aggregate is equal to 
the number of firms in the sector multiplied by the firm output. So, in fact we have (38), with qj 
= 1. In the basic model, qj = ej/(ej - 1), the love-of-variety effect implies a more than 
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proportional increase in the composite output when firm output increases, see (38). Inserting 
(41), (43) and (44) in (38) yields, dropping indices j and r, 
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A ‘^’ denotes the value of a certain variable in equilibrium. When we turn the love-of-variety 
on and off, we can see what happens in (47). Table 4.2 presents the results. 
 
Table 4.2  Equilibria with and without love-of-variaty 
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Table 4 shows that, when love-of-variety is turned off, the equilibria simplify. The difference 
between raw output price/quantity and final output price/quantity is just the mark-up. What 
happens is that raw output falls with exactly the fixed set-up cost (= x
0,e/e). Because firms earn 
zero profit in the long run, prices increase with a mark-up (= p
0,e/(e - 1)). Where we first had 
increasing returns at the sectoral level affecting intermediate input and factor prices, we now 
have constant returns at the sectoral level, yet retaining monopolistic competition through mark-
up pricing.  
A simulation with q = 1 confirms these expectations. Compared to the base run, almost 
nothing changes. We notice that output quantities rise by a factor equal to the mark-up and raw 
output prices fall by a factor equal to the mark-up. All other variables, such as the number of 
firms, input prices, firm and sectoral output prices and quantities remain unchanged
20. 
Concluding, the model without love-of-variety does not seem appropriate to describe the 
welfare effects of the introduction of the new services directive. Because in this way, the 
welfare effects of introducing mark-ups are non-existent, since we have constant returns at the 
sectoral level. In other words, this analysis shows that any welfare effects that are existent in the 
DS model come from love-of-variety and not from mark-up pricing! Actually, this confirms 
what we already know from section 2.1.2, in particular (17), where the effects on welfare are 
nullified when q is set equal to 1. 
 
20 Although the raw output price falls with the mark-up, input prices stay the same. This is because the location parameters 
in the calibration have changed.   52 
4.2.3  Liberalisation 
As a final experiment, it is interesting to see how the imperfect competitive model reacts in 
liberalisation scenario. One would expect, when import tariffs are abolished, that sectors with 
increasing returns technologies profit relatively more than sectors featuring constant returns 
technologies.  
In this section, I compare two simulations. One considers a reduction of import tariffs under 
constant returns and the other under increasing returns
21. This reduction is done gradually to 
circumvent numerical problems with solving the model. The first year of reduction is 2005 and 
the last year is 2015. The import tariffs are fully abolished from 2015 onwards. Because we 
only consider the long term effects of liberalisation, it does not matter much for the results if 
tariff abolishment occurs instantly or gradually. Here, I follow the basic DS approach. Hence, I 
assume consumers prefer diversity in products. 
 
The import tariffs are shown in table 4.3. Import tariffs for the services and transport sector are 
zero. Notice that the import tariffs are relatively largest for non-OECD countries. Furthermore, 
the agricultural sector shows the largest import tariffs. Therefore, one would expect for 
instance, larger exports to the agricultural sector in the rest of the world. Note that, we simulate 
with a very aggregated sector structure. For instance, manufacturing of food or other 
agricultural products is aggregated under manufacturing, which accounts for only a small part 
of total manufacturing. In that respect, this analysis does fully reflect the gains from 
liberalisation for third world countries.   
Table 4.3  Import tariffs in percentages of import 
  Agriculture  Energy  Manufacturing 
                   
from - to  EU  rOECD  ROW  EU  rOECD  ROW  EU  rOECD  ROW 
EU  0  8  11  0  1  7  0  3  11 
rOECD  1  0  14  0  0  7  2  0  9 
ROW  3  5  0  1  1  0  4  5  0 
                   
Source: GTAP database 
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the simulation results for the two scenarios. The first thing we recognize is 
that raw output has increased most in both scenarios in the agricultural sector for the OECD 
countries and decreased for the non-OECD countries. Because OECD countries can now export 
more to non-OECD countries, they produce more. Furthermore, we see that the transport sector 
profits in all regions from liberalisation, although there were no tariff barriers in the first place. 
 
21 Here, all sectors except agriculture feature increasing returns. In particular, we assume demand elasticities as they are 
given in Table A1 in Annex 2.   53 
It is reasonable that regions trade more after liberalisation, which leads to increased transports. 
Indeed, the services sector shows almost no changes. 
Table 4.4  Long term macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation 
    CRTS  IRTS 
           
sector  region  net trade position  value added  net trade position  value added 
           
agriculture  ROW  - 64  - 0.1%  - 316  - 4.2% 
  EU  32  4.9%  109  12.0% 
  rOECD  35  3.3%  219  13.7% 
energy  ROW  - 115  - 1.5%  - 135  - 1.3% 
  EU  39  5.1%  52  6.9% 
  rOECD  70  4.6%  77  4.6% 
manufact.  ROW  443  2.6%  551  5.5% 
  EU  - 127  2.2%  - 132  - 0.4% 
  rOECD  - 342  0.3%  -461  - 4.2% 
services  ROW  38  0.2%  - 11  0.1% 
  EU  - 40  0.1%  - 33  0.1% 
  rOECD  3  0.1%  46  0.1% 
transport  ROW  25  3.2%  2  3.1% 
  EU  - 22  2.3%  - 14  2.7% 
  rOECD  - 3  1.7%  12  2.4% 
           
Source: WorldScan simulations. CRTS stands for Constant Returns To Scale and IRTS for Increasing Returns To Scale. 
Numbers are changes compared to the base run in the year 2040: liberalisation under crts compared to crts and 
liberalisation under irts compared to irts. EU, rOECD and ROW denote respectively European Union, rest of OECD and 
Rest Of World. All values are changes with respect to the baserun and measured in quantities. 
 
If we compare value added over the two scenarios, we see that under increasing returns to scale 
for the agricultural sector in OECD countries produces relatively more and in non OECD 
countries relatively less. Hence, if we assume increasing returns, it is more efficient that the 
OECD countries produce even more than under constant returns and export that to the other 
countries. Notice that the agricultural sector has constant returns technology in both scenarios. 
Therefore, these changes have to originate from higher input demands from other sectors which 
do have increasing returns. To confirm these specialisation patterns, one could consider changes 
in the net trade position. Table 4.4 shows that OECD countries indeed have increased their 
export more than their import and non-OECD countries vice versa. Consequently, the EU and 
the rest of the OECD countries specialize in agriculture. In addition, the EU specializes in 
energy and withdraws means from the other sectors. The other OECD countries clearly 
withdraw from the manufacturing sector and spent their inputs in the other sectors. Finally, the 
rest of the world apparently specializes in manufacturing, which includes amongst others 
manufacturing of agricultural products.    54 
Table 4.5  Consumption annual growth, 2040 
  CRTS  IRTS 
     
Rest of the World  0.2%  0.7% 
European Union  0.5%  0.5% 
Rest of the OECD  0.2%  0.1% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. CRTS stands for Constant Returns To Scale and IRTS for Increasing Returns To Scale. 
Numbers represent differences in annual growth of consumption between the baserun and the liberalisation variant. 
 
As for the general welfare effects,  we can look at annual growth of consumption. Table 4.5 
shows that as a result of liberalisation consumption grows for all regions under constant as well 
as increasing returns. In general, the welfare effects are almost the same under constant and 
increasing returns to scale. However, the rest of the world does benefit significantly more 
assuming scale economies. 
Concluding, specialisation patterns are the same in both scenarios. Nevertheless, 
specialisation is much stronger under increasing returns than under constant returns, because 
firms can exploit their technology better and reallocate resources efficiently.  
 
5  Conclusions 
The purpose of this memorandum is to find a suitable modelling approach to identify and 
describe scale economies which can be incorporated in WorldScan.  
From section 1.1 we know that scale economies are commonly modelled through a fixed 
set-up cost in the production process. In this way, producers set a mark-up on marginal costs to 
at least cover their fixed costs. From section 1.2 we know that as soon as an agent does not take 
prices as given, we have imperfect competition. Therefore, scale economies introduce imperfect 
competition. 
The second chapter reviews the literature on scale economies and especially imperfect 
competition in general equilibrium. Economic literature shows among others two main research 
areas in microeconomic theory. First, there is industrial organization, which includes small 
group models focusing on strategic interaction between agents. The second mainstream in 
microeconomic theory is monopolistic competition. Monopolistic competition particularly 
works with large group models, hence, where the number of firms is large and strategic 
interaction is absent. We conclude, that a large group model is more suitable in our case, since 
we do not need strategic interaction between firms to describe scale economies. In particular, 
the extended Dixit-Stiglitz model should accommodate our goals very well. The third chapter 
shows that in many currently applied models, the Dixit-Stiglitz specification for domestic 
demand is combined with the Armington specification for import demand. Hence, we follow 
this in our approach.   55 
The expansion of WorldScan with the approach as discussed in section 4.1 appears to describe 
scale economies well as the simulations show. In particular, we understand that, first of all, 
increasing returns do not naturally lead to higher output prices. Rather, increasing returns affect 
the cost structure in the model due to additional demands for inputs. The brand price is the 
outcome of the producer price multiplied by the mark-up. 
Secondly, producer prices can decrease as well as increase. This depends on which price 
effect is stronger, the fall of the ‘own input’ price (caused by efficiency in production) or the 
rise in all other input prices and factor prices (caused by additional input demand). 
Thirdly, introducing increasing returns through a fixed cost does not necessarily lead to 
entering firms to the market. The number of firms depends on raw output and the set-up cost. If 
raw output does not increase enough to compensate for the set-up cost, firms even exit the 
market. 
Fourthly, sectors with strong increasing returns technologies can demand high mark-ups on 
producer prices and consequently attract possible entrants to the sector. On the other hand, 
sectors with low mark-ups cause firms to exit the market, since they cannot cover their fixed 
cost. 
Fifthly, the love-of-variety effect determines whether or not we have constant returns at a 
sectoral level. Assuming customers prefer diversity in products leads to increasing returns to 
scale at an aggregated level. Assuming consumers are indifferent leads to constant returns to 
scale at an aggregated level. In conclusion, any welfare effects in this model originate from 
love-of-variety of consumers. 
Finally, a liberalisation exercise shows that specialisation patterns are stronger under 
increasing returns, because production is more efficient. In particular, producing more causes 
averages costs to drop. 
Overall, we can conclude that the effects of this expansion of WorldScan can be called 
significant!   56 
Annex 1: Calibration 
Estimation of mark-ups 
Over the past decades, a substantial body of literature has been devoted to the empirical 
identification of market power (e.g. Schmalensee, 1989; Bresnahan, 1989). This literature 
focused on the identification of monopoly pricing, i.e. whether there is evidence of pricing 
above marginal costs. In theory, it is possible to define the degree of monopoly power of a 
given producer as the mark-up over marginal cost normalized by the producer price, which is 
called the Lerner index. The empirical measurement of the Lerner index and related measures is 
quite difficult, particularly at an aggregate level. As a result, there have been few empirical 
studies identifying market power at the aggregate level (cf. Geroski, et al., 1995). The main 
problem arises from the fact that while prices can be measured, marginal costs are not directly 
observable. Therefore, indirect measures have to be developed. Hall (1986, 1988) proposed a 
methodology to estimate mark-ups by using the short-run fluctuations of output and production 
inputs by sector. This method has become popular and is widely applied in the empirical 
literature. 
Hall’s approach 
The approach by Hall (1986, 1988) to the estimation of mark-ups is based on ideas on 
productivity measurement contained in Solow (1957). The marginal cost of a firm that uses 








= ,              (A.1) 
where Q is real value added, L is labour, K is capital, w is the wage rate, r is the rental price of 
capital and q is the rate of technical progress. In the denominator, the change in output is 
adjusted for the amount by which output would rise if there were no increase in the production 
inputs. Rewriting (A.1) and assuming that mark-ups are constant over time and the rate of 
technological progress is described by a random deviation from a constant rate yields the 
following: 
 
  ( ) ( ) t t t t t t u k l k q + + - D = - D q ma ,          (A.2) 
where lowercase variables indicate log-levels, m is the mark-up, a is equal to wL/PQ and ut is a 
random deviation
22,23. Unfortunately, (A.2) cannot be estimated directly, since imperfect 
 
22 It is assumed that wL + rK = PQ, i.e. constant-returns-to-scale. As a results rK/PQ = 1 - a, which simplifies (A.2). However, 
this implies a bias in case of economies or diseconomies of scale.   57 
competition would imply a correlation between the labour/capital ratio and the productivity 
term. Usually, this can be solved by using the instrumental variable estimation approach. 
However, the instruments used for the labour/capital ratio have been criticised to be rather 
implausible. In addition, in small samples the advantage of using the instrumental variable 
approach is with respect to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not clear. As argued by Caballero 
and Lyons (1989), a very small correlation between the instruments and productivity growth 
may prove more problematic than biases emerging from the OLS procedure. Concluding, Hall’s 
approach is stuck with an identification problem. 
Roeger’s approach 
Roeger (1995) proposes an alternative way of computing mark-ups. Here, it is convenient to 
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Including (A.3) in the Solow residual yields: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )q a a B k q B k l q SR - + D - D = D - - D - D = 1 1 .        (A.4) 
An equivalent expression can be derived for the price-based Solow residual (SRP): 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )q a a B r p B p r w SRP - + D - D - = D - D - + D = 1 1 .      (A.5) 
Subtracting (A.5) from (A.4) and adding an error term gives Roeger’s equation from which B 
can be estimated using OLS: 
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      (A.6) 
Estimation of (A.6) compared to (A.2) has two advantages: 1. B can be estimated directly using 
OLS and 2. only nominal variables appear in (A.6), which helps overcome some data 
availability problems. Furthermore, (A.6) can be extended straightforwardly by incorporating 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 If we rewrite (A.2) a bit, the Solow residual (SR) is obtained: SR = Dq - aDl - (1-a)Dk = (m-1)a(Dl - Dk) + q. Under Solow’s 
assumptions the following should hold: The productivity residual is uncorrelated with any variable that is uncorrelated with 
the rate of growth of true productivity (Hall, 1990). However, data often reject this theorem.    58 
intermediate inputs and defining mark-up ratios over gross output instead of value added 
(Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta, 1996). Accordingly, Dyt and Dxt become: 
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  (A.7) 
where q
0 and p
0 are respectively gross output and its price, and m and p
m are respectively 
intermediate inputs and their prices. 
Under constant-returns-to-scale, Roeger’s equation provides an unbiased estimate of the 
Lerner index B. However, decreasing-/increasing-returns-to-scale induce an upward/downward 
bias in the estimate of the mark-up. Correcting for this bias would imply lower/higher mark-ups 
than those following from (A.6) or (A.7). Thus, mark-up estimates from Roeger’s approach 
represent lower bounds under economies of scale. 
Estimates for 14 OECD countries 
Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta (1996a, 1996b) estimate mark-up ratios using Roeger’s 
approach with intermediate inputs, i.e. they estimate B using (A.16). They cover 36 
manufacturing and 7 service sectors over 14 OECD countries in the period 1970-1992. 
Two modifications are made. First, since no sector-specific information was available, the 
rental price of capital is simplified. In particular, the rental price is defined as the sum of the 
expected real cost of funds for the firm and the discard rate of gross capital stock multiplied by 
the economy-wide deflator for fixed business investment. Second, (A.7) is estimated using 
nominal output data. Often these include net indirect taxes. Including these in the estimation 
would cause an upward bias in the mark-up ratios. Therefore, one usually uses output data at 
factor costs. When prices include taxes, this can be adjusted by dividing the estimated mark-up 
by the net indirect tax rate. 
The estimated mark-up ratios for services are more tentative than those for manufacturing for 
two reasons. First, the service industries represent much broader aggregates than the industry 
detail used for the manufacturing sector, hence, firms operating in (some of) these service 
sectors are likely to be quite heterogeneous. Second, the quality of statistical information for the 
service sectors is poorer than that available for manufacturing industries. The main results are 
the following: 
 
·  In general, in all countries, and almost all manufacturing industries considered, the estimated 
mark-ups are positive and statistically significant at the 5%-level.    59 
·  Compared to previous studies such as Hall (1990) and Roeger (1995)
24, the estimated mark-ups 
are substantially lower and more in line with observed profit rates. Overall, the level is between 
5 and 25%. 
·  Mark-ups in the service sectors are generally higher than those in manufacturing, suggesting 
that departures from perfect competition are even more frequent in these sectors than in 
manufacturing. In several services, entry restricting regulations are likely to contribute to high 
mark-ups. 
·  Where manufacturing sectors are concerned, the level of the mark-ups appears related to the 
market structure of a certain sector. In particular, they are substantially lower in industries with 
small establishments’ size, where the number of firms typically grows in line with the size of 
the market, than in industries with large establishments, where concentration remains relatively 
stable. 
·  There is considerable variation of mark-ups across countries and industries. Some of this 
variation may be due to the impact of specific policies. Across time the mark-ups remain 
relatively stable. Furthermore, it appears that high mark-ups (over 40%) occur less often since 
1970. 
Calculation of number of firms 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-index-method 
The most common method for calculating the number of firms in an applied general equilibrium 
models is the Herfindahl-Hirschman-index (HHI) method. This section explains this method, 
analyses the pros and cons and provides some alternatives. The discussion is greatly inspired by 
Erp, et al (2001). 
HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. 
For example, for a market consisting of four firms with shares of thirty, thirty, twenty and 




2 = 2600). Possible values for the HHI 
range from 0 to 10,000. 
The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market and 
approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of relatively equal size. The 
HHI increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size 
between those firms increases. 
In the AHTENA model the HHI was formerly calculated based on CBS-data, which 
classifies the number of firms in intervals. Hence, the HHI is calculated as follows: 
 
 
24 The difference between the results of Roeger (1995) and Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta (1996) is due to the adjustment 































j j z         (A.17) 
and kj is the number of firms in class j, mj is the midmark and zj is the market share. The 
reciproce of HHI is then used as measure for the number of firms. When firms are assumed 
identical, all firms are in the same class (jj = 1) and k = 1 / HHI. 
Two problems 
Calculations following the approach above can yield some peculiar results. Erp, et al. (2001) 
find for example that in half of all industries the development following the HHI is the 
oppposite of growth according to CBS-data. These results seem to follow from two problems. 
The first problem is that in (A.17) the weights are determined by the number of employees 
instead of the number of workers. In particular, one-man businesses are not accounted for. 
The HHI is actually a measure for concentration and not much of a weighting factor. As an 
illustration, suppose there exist 10 firms with each one employee. The weight for the only class 
is z1 = 1/10 and thus HHI = 10(1/10)
2 = 1/10. Hence, the number of firms is 10. Now, suppose 
there is one firm with 10 employees, one with 9, etc. The weights equal, zi = i/55 and HHI = Si 
i(i/55)
2 = 0.127. The number of employees is 7.86. Thus, when the actual number of firms does 
not change, only the size, the HHI shows that the number firms has decreased. This 
displacement-effect is a direct effect of the definition of the HHI as a measure for the degree of 
concentration. 
Erp, et al. (2001) conclude by saying that few alternatives exist for the HHI-method. 
Nevertheless, they pose a few alternatives without a theoretical foundation. 
Alternatives 
One possible alternative is to calculate the number of firms based on a weighted average. First, 
the weighted average number of firms per class is calculated. Second, the total number of firms 
is computed by multiplying the weighted average by the number of classes. The disadvantage of 
this method is that a change in the size of firms still influences the calculated number of firms. 
Hence, the displacement-problem yet remains. 
Another possibility is to actually use the number of firms according to the CBS-data, 
ignoring the differences in size. Each company that entries the market, no matter the size, 
increases the total number of firms in the market. The displacement-effect is solved. Perhaps, 
that a change in sales changes the average production per firm. Furthermore, there is no 
problem concerning the mid-mark of a class. Basically, the only disadvantage is that this 
method implicitly assumes symmetry between firms. This might be in contrast with the   61 
empirics. Nevertheless, this second alternative is the approach which is now modelled in a new 
version of ATHENA, because most data problems are solved. 
Approach for WorldScan 
In the approach for WorldScan, we set the number of firms in the base year equal to one, 
because of numerical problems caused by the high numbers of firms in the data. I argued that 
this alters the interpretation, because the number of firms is interpreted as an index rather than 
the absolute number of firms. The same holds for the fixed costs and brand quantity, since these 
variables change accordingly. However, a time series of these three variables still shows the 
relative change.   62 
Annex 2: Long term effects of introduction of increasing 
returns to scale 
 
Table A1  Model parameters 
Sector  Elasticity of demand  Fixed cost 
     
Agriculture  10
10  3.6 ´ 10
-8 
Energy  7.7  62 
Manufacturing  7.5  813 
Services  4.0  2780 
Transport  4.0  257 
 
Source: Oliveira-Martins, Pilat, Scarpetta (1996a, 1996b) and WorldScan 
calculations. Fixed costs are in terms of quantities. In terms of firm output the 
fixed cost is equal to the reciproce of the demand elasticity 
 
 
Table A2  Input prices, Agriculture, 2040 
    CRTS    IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.71  73%  31%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.67  40%  7%  1%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.72  43%  11%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  0.71  73%  31%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.67  40%  7%  1%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.72  43%  11%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.71  73%  31%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.67  40%  7%  1%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.72  43%  11%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  0.71  73%  31%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.67  40%  7%  1%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.72  43%  11%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.71  73%  31%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.67  40%  7%  1%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.72  43%  11%  0%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. CRTS denotes Constant-Return-To-Scale and IRTS denotes Increasing-Returns-To-Scale. EU, rOECD and ROW 
denote respectively European Union, rest of OECD and Rest Of World. “man II” and “man III” denote respectively results for a test of halving the 
demand elasticity with fixed costs endogenous and keeping fixed costs fixed. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
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Table A3  Input prices, Energy, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  1.36  3%  12%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1.53  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  5%  2%  2%  13%  13% 
  rOECD  1.05  4%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
energy  ROW  1.36  3%  12%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1.53  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  5%  2%  2%  13%  13% 
  rOECD  1.05  4%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  1.36  3%  12%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1.53  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  5%  2%  2%  13%  13% 
  rOECD  1.05  4%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
services  ROW  1.36  3%  12%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1.53  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  5%  2%  2%  13%  13% 
  rOECD  1.05  4%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
transport  ROW  1.36  3%  12%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1.53  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  5%  2%  2%  13%  13% 
  rOECD  1.05  4%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A4  Input prices, Manufacturing, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.64  19%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.71  18%  − 6%  − 8%  1%  − 3%  5%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
  rOECD  0.70  22%  − 8%  − 8%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  0.64  19%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.71  18%  − 6%  − 8%  1%  − 3%  5%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
  rOECD  0.70  22%  − 8%  − 8%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.64  19%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.71  18%  − 6%  − 8%  1%  − 3%  5%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
  rOECD  0.70  22%  − 8%  − 8%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  0.64  19%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.71  18%  − 6%  − 8%  1%  − 3%  5%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
  rOECD  0.70  22%  − 8%  − 8%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.64  19%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.71  18%  − 6%  − 8%  1%  − 3%  5%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
  rOECD  0.70  22%  − 8%  − 8%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   64 
Table A5  Input prices, Services, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  1.20  − 8%  24%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.22  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  1.13  − 5%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  1.20  − 8%  24%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.22  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  1.13  − 5%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  1.20  − 8%  24%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.22  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  1.13  − 5%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  1.20  − 8%  24%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.22  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  1.13  − 5%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  1.20  − 8%  24%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.22  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  1.13  − 5%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A6  Input prices, Transport, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.73  12%  38%  − 5%  − 1%  0%  1%  − 1%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.81  − 1%  5%  3%  − 2%  8%  5%  − 27%  19%  19% 
  rOECD  0.85  2%  6%  6%  0%  0%  0%  − 2%  1%  1% 
                       
energy  ROW  0.73  12%  38%  − 5%  − 1%  0%  1%  − 1%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.81  − 1%  5%  3%  − 2%  8%  5%  − 27%  19%  19% 
  rOECD  0.85  2%  6%  6%  0%  0%  0%  − 2%  1%  1% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.73  12%  38%  − 5%  − 1%  0%  1%  − 1%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.81  − 1%  5%  3%  − 2%  8%  5%  − 27%  19%  19% 
  rOECD  0.85  2%  6%  6%  0%  0%  0%  − 2%  1%  1% 
                       
services  ROW  0.73  12%  38%  − 5%  − 1%  0%  1%  − 1%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.81  − 1%  5%  3%  − 2%  8%  5%  − 27%  19%  19% 
  rOECD  0.85  2%  6%  6%  0%  0%  0%  − 2%  1%  1% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.73  12%  38%  − 5%  − 1%  0%  1%  − 1%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.81  − 1%  5%  3%  − 2%  8%  5%  − 27%  19%  19% 
  rOECD  0.85  2%  6%  6%  0%  0%  0%  − 2%  1%  1% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   65 
Table A7  Factor prices, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.05  588%  201%  − 8%  2%  − 1%  2%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.54  97%  11%  21%  9%  31%  45%  6%  85%  85% 
  rOECD  0.24  113%  17%  25%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  0.09  111%  59%  − 6%  1%  0%  0%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  0.22  33%  4%  5%  4%  11%  10%  4%  28%  28% 
  rOECD  0.16  33%  6%  7%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.07  313%  129%  − 7%  2%  − 1%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  1.00  65%  7%  14%  6%  22%  29%  5%  59%  59% 
  rOECD  0.80  71%  12%  17%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  1.02  50%  32%  − 6%  1%  0%  0%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  2.61  17%  1%  1%  2%  7%  1%  4%  18%  18% 
  rOECD  4.67  12%  2%  3%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.27  198%  92%  − 7%  1%  − 1%  1%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  1.61  48%  5%  9%  5%  17%  19%  5%  44%  44% 
  rOECD  2.91  48%  8%  12%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A8  Raw output prices, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.69  76%  32%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.63  38%  5%  2%  2%  8%  8%  1%  20%  20% 
  rOECD  0.70  40%  9%  2%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  1.23  4%  14%  − 3%  − 5%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  0.87  2%  6%  0%  − 12%  6%  2%  2%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  0.91  0%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.58  32%  1%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.71  8%  − 13%  − 14%  2%  − 8%  6%  1%  − 15%  − 15% 
  rOECD  0.69  12%  − 12%  − 12%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  1.16  2%  25%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  1.20  − 15%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 26%  3%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  1.11  − 18%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.71  25%  41%  − 6%  − 1%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.83  − 11%  4%  3%  − 2%  10%  5%  − 26%  24%  24% 
  rOECD  0.83  − 9%  5%  6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   66 
Table A9  Raw output quantities, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  9901  − 56%  − 35%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1012  1%  16%  − 17%  − 1%  − 20%  − 28%  − 3%  − 44%  − 44% 
  rOECD  1613  − 5%  14%  − 21%  0%  0%  2%  1%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  2849  − 11%  − 14%  2%  − 4%  1%  0%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1186  − 7%  9%  − 8%  41%  − 11%  − 11%  1%  − 24%  − 24% 
  rOECD  2248  − 11%  0%  − 8%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  44058  − 36%  − 3%  − 6%  1%  − 2%  1%  1%  − 5%  − 5% 
  EU  9486  − 4%  − 23%  12%  − 7%  18%  − 26%  − 3%  40%  40% 
  rOECD  18875  − 22%  − 13%  11%  1%  − 2%  2%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
                       
services  ROW  21185  − 8%  − 19%  1%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  12460  16%  0%  − 4%  − 1%  − 5%  25%  0%  − 10%  − 10% 
  rOECD  31115  16%  − 2%  − 4%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  5294  − 36%  − 34%  1%  0%  1%  0%  − 5%  1%  1% 
  EU  1627  12%  8%  − 10%  2%  − 14%  − 17%  70%  − 30%  − 30% 
  rOECD  3088  1%  − 1%  − 12%  0%  1%  1%  − 8%  3%  3% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A10  Number of firms, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  27.2  − 56%  − 35%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  2.78  1%  16%  − 17%  − 1%  − 20%  − 28%  − 3%  − 44%  − 44% 
  rOECD  4.43  − 5%  14%  − 21%  0%  0%  2%  1%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  6.85  − 23%  − 14%  2%  − 4%  1%  0%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  2.85  − 19%  9%  − 8%  23%  − 11%  − 11%  1%  − 24%  − 24% 
  rOECD  5.41  − 22%  0%  − 8%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  8.34  − 45%  − 16%  − 6%  1%  − 2%  1%  1%  − 5%  − 5% 
  EU  1.79  − 17%  − 33%  − 3%  − 7%  2%  − 26%  − 3%  3%  143% 
  rOECD  3.57  − 33%  − 25%  − 4%  1%  − 2%  2%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
                       
services  ROW  2.54  − 31%  − 19%  1%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1.49  − 13%  0%  − 4%  − 1%  − 5%  − 6%  0%  − 10%  − 10% 
  rOECD  3.73  − 13%  − 2%  − 4%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  6.85  − 52%  − 34%  1%  0%  1%  0%  − 5%  1%  1% 
  EU  2.11  − 16%  8%  − 10%  2%  − 14%  − 17%  27%  − 30%  − 30% 
  rOECD  4.00  − 25%  − 1%  − 12%  0%  1%  1%  − 8%  3%  3% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   67 
Table A11  Composite price, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.69  76%  32%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.63  38%  5%  2%  2%  8%  8%  1%  20%  20% 
  rOECD  0.70  40%  9%  2%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  1.23  − 7%  14%  − 3%  − 5%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  0.87  4%  6%  0%  − 16%  6%  2%  2%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  0.91  − 7%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.58  20%  − 15%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.71  17%  − 3%  − 8%  2%  − 3%  6%  1%  − 8%  − 32% 
  rOECD  0.69  13%  − 6%  − 9%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  1.16  12%  25%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  1.20  4%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 12%  3%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  1.11  − 26%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.71  12%  41%  − 6%  − 1%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.83  − 2%  4%  3%  − 2%  10%  5%  − 29%  24%  24% 
  rOECD  0.83  − 16%  5%  6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A12  Composite quantity, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  9901  − 56%  − 35%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  1012  1%  16%  − 17%  − 1%  − 20%  − 28%  − 3%  − 44%  − 44% 
  rOECD  1613  − 5%  14%  − 21%  0%  0%  2%  1%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  2849  − 1%  − 14%  2%  − 4%  1%  0%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  1186  − 9%  9%  − 8%  48%  − 11%  − 11%  1%  − 24%  − 24% 
  rOECD  2248  − 4%  0%  − 8%  − 6%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  44058  − 30%  15%  − 6%  1%  − 2%  1%  1%  − 5%  − 5% 
  EU  9486  − 12%  − 31%  6%  − 7%  12%  − 26%  − 3%  29%  76% 
  rOECD  18875  − 23%  − 19%  7%  1%  − 2%  2%  1%  − 6%  − 6% 
                       
services  ROW  21185  − 16%  − 19%  1%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  12460  − 6%  0%  − 4%  − 1%  − 5%  5%  0%  − 10%  − 10% 
  rOECD  31115  29%  − 2%  − 4%  0%  0%  − 1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  5294  − 29%  − 34%  1%  0%  1%  0%  − 5%  1%  1% 
  EU  1627  2%  8%  − 10%  2%  − 14%  − 17%  77%  − 30%  − 30% 
  rOECD  3088  9%  − 1%  − 12%  0%  1%  1%  − 8%  3%  3% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   68 
Table A13  Brand price, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  0.69  76%  32%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.63  38%  5%  2%  2%  8%  8%  1%  20%  20% 
  rOECD  0.70  40%  9%  2%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  1.23  19%  14%  − 3%  − 5%  1%  1%  0%  2%  2% 
  EU  0.87  18%  6%  0%  1%  6%  2%  2%  14%  14% 
  rOECD  0.91  15%  6%  1%  − 2%  0%  1%  0%  1%  1% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  0.58  52%  16%  − 6%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.71  25%  0%  0%  2%  6%  6%  1%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  0.69  29%  1%  2%  0%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  1.16  36%  25%  − 6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  − 1%  − 1% 
  EU  1.20  13%  1%  0%  1%  6%  − 2%  3%  15%  15% 
  rOECD  1.11  9%  1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  0.71  67%  41%  − 6%  − 1%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  0.83  19%  4%  3%  − 2%  10%  5%  − 2%  24%  24% 
  rOECD  0.83  21%  5%  6%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers. 
 
Table A14  Brand quantity, 2040 
    CRTS   IRTS 
                       


















                       
agricult.  ROW  364  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  364  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  rOECD  364  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
energy  ROW  416  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  416  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  rOECD  416  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
manufac.  ROW  5285  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  5285  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  − 58% 
  rOECD  5285  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
services  ROW  8340  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  8340  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  rOECD  8340  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
                       
transport  ROW  773  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  EU  773  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
  rOECD  773  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The percentages are relative changes compared to the CRTS numbers.   69 
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